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The Shape of Things

WENDELL WILLKIE'S ROLE AS LEADER OF the loyal opposition was played to perfection in his radio report to the American people. Mr. Willkie was sharply critical of the Administration and of the conduct of the war, but his strictures had none of the querulousness or patent insincerity we are accustomed to expect from Republican leaders endeavoring to make political capital out of the Administration's mistakes. In its breadth of view and bold concreteness the speech went far beyond the government's most advanced position. Mr. Willkie has reason to believe from his own observations that lend-lease aid to our Allies is largely "boasts and broken promises," and he demands a more offensive psychology in the conduct of the war. He calls again for a second front in Europe and for a speedy invasion of Burma. He recognizes that "India is our problem" and resents the "half-ignorant, half-patronizing way" in which we conduct diplomatic relations with nations in Eastern Europe and Asia. He opposes the Administration's moves toward censorship. Above all, he demands an end of colonialism, with dates set *now* for the liberation of all peoples and with suitable guaranties. All these proposals happen to coincide exactly with our own views. We fear, however, that the timing of his speech, coupled with the notable failure to say a single kind word for the Administration, may serve no good purpose next Tuesday. The speech may in fact help to elect Republicans who are diametrically opposed to everything in it and who are in large part responsible for the Administration's failure to advance the Willkie program.

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THE LONG-EXPECTED BRITISH DRIVE TO "crush Rommel" has opened in a spirit of sober confidence. Headquarters in Cairo are maintaining a reserved attitude, but if there is less ballyhoo than attended previous desert offensives, there seems to be no less determination and much better preparation. Quick results are not to be expected, since the narrowness of the Alamein front and the depth of the fortified Axis positions have produced a tactical picture resembling that in France during the last war. Only after the artillery and infantry have opened gaps in the enemy lines will it be possible

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for armored forces to take up their leading role. A great part, however, is being played by the Allied aerial forces, which have established complete supremacy and have been able, in addition to giving strong support to the ground troops, to maintain a smashing offensive against Rommel's communications. The stress laid by Axis sources on the numbers and equipment of the Eighth Army and particularly its air strength is a hopeful augury, for it suggests the preparation of alibis. In this new campaign the primary British objective is, of course, to end the Axis threat to Egypt. But it has larger implications in relation to the battle for the Mediterranean which has been in progress ever since Italy entered the war. That is why the R.A.F. has been crossing the Alps once again to create havoc and panic in northern Italy and why a war of nerves is raging around Dakar.

*

ADMIRAL LAND, WHO HAS LONG DISPLAYED intolerance of trade unions, has managed to beat his own record for irresponsibility. In a speech to the Investment Bankers' Association last week he said, according to the New York *Times,* that shipbuilding and the war effort generally were being obstructed by "union organizers, profiteers, typewriter strategists, and needle boys. As far as the organizers are concerned, for the duration, in my opinion, they ought to be shot at sunrise." According to *PM,* Land spoke of organizers without a prefixed description, but when asked by reporters to whom he referred said he meant union organizers. In a so-called "clarification" of his remarks the Admiral said, "I meticulously refrained from any adjective qualifying the term 'organizers.' As everyone knows, there are all kinds of organizers for all kinds of projects. My only interest is in organized production." Possibly organized production might get on better if it were not in charge of organizers of the stripe of Admiral Land, whose speech was either deliberate mischief-making or, if his explanation is to be accepted, childish nonsense. In his defense, the New York *Herald Tribune* says he is doing an outstanding job as War Shipping Administrator and chairman of the Maritime Commission and ought, therefore, to be allowed "the indiscretion of exhibiting his prejudices." This plea, which incidentally makes a liar of the Admiral, disregards the fact that the success of the shipbuilding program is dependent on the cooperation of labor, which so far has been given ungrudgingly. But we have yet to learn that the ideal method of seeking cooperation is with a firing squad. Even the Nazis—the leading experimentalists along these lines—have not made an outstanding success of it.

*

SENATOR JOSHUA LEE TRAILED THE FUMES of bathtub gin and rotgut whiskey through the Senate chamber last week when, after the unscrupulous fashion of dry fanatics, he tried to tack on the draft bill an amendment to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages of any kind in communities adjacent to military or naval posts. And if anyone is wondering why our legislators are so often regarded as less than adequate to their high calling, let him note this report from Washington: "It is admitted on all sides that a roll-call vote will see the Lee amendment through. . . . If it were on a voice vote the amendment would be defeated hands down." The Senate managed to avoid the issue, at least until after the elections, by sending the amendment to the military committee for hearings, but we must be prepared for further devious attempts by the drys to eliminate the "evils of the liquor traffic" by substituting the tenfold evils of another bootleg era. The fifteen wild and weary years of the great experiment, when lawlessness became the rule from the lowest speakeasy to the most respectable family living-room, taught them exactly nothing. It has been asserted that a Nazi-subsidized organization in Geneva is filtering prohibition propaganda into this country as part of the drive to stir up discord. The prohibition camel may be the latest guise of the Trojan horse, and certainly we can think of nothing better calculated to disturb our domestic peace than a fight over the right to take a drink. But knowing the capacity of our drys for self-intoxication, we doubt their need for outside stimulants.

*

CABINET CHANGES IN CHILE HAVE NOT justified the hope that that country has finally cleared up its foreign policy. If the resigning Foreign Minister, Barros Jarpa, was known as a reactionary within his own Radical Party, his successor Fernandez y Fernandez, has an even more questionable record as a former follower of General Ibañez, the "strong man" of Chile. The hours that he spent in Buenos Aires on his way home from Montevideo, where he represented his country as ambassador, are not likely to have increased his doubtful eagerness to break with the Axis. All the correspondents agree that the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú, never left his Chilean colleague alone for a moment. He even seized the occasion of a ceremony to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the Chilean national hero, General O'Higgins, to deliver a venomous commentary on "good neighborliness," addressed equally to Sumner Welles and the new Chilean Foreign Minister. The dissatisfaction of democratic Chile with the President's solution of the crisis is revealed in the vast program of meetings and demonstrations for a rupture with the Axis organized by the various political parties and unions, to start this week. But again the fascists were the first to strike. Encouraged by President Rios's hesitations, they staged last Sunday a "spontaneous" demonstration in honor of Barros Jarpa as the symbol of

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resistance, not to Hitler, but to Washington. Developments in Chile again point the lesson that in spite of all that has happened in Europe no democratic government or movement wants to learn—the lesson that appeasement of the enemy, whether external or internal, leads only to democratic demoralization, growing weakness, and final defeat.

*

THE SENATE DISPLAYED A SHOCKING LACK of regard for military necessities when it attached two crippling riders to the bill authorizing the drafting of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old boys. Of these the most serious as well as the most inexplicable is the amendment requiring youths under twenty to have a full year of training in this country before being sent abroad for combat duty. There are obvious moral and educational reasons why the drafting of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old boys should be postponed as long as possible, but the chief effect of the amendment is to place an intolerable burden on the authorities responsible for training and distributing military personnel. Certain specialized types of combat duty require more than a year of training, but for many other types six or eight months of training are entirely adequate. In view of the uncertainties of the coming year, it is most unwise to tie the army's hands on such a vital matter as troop distribution. The amendment deferring farm workers is more understandable but no more defensible. The problem of farm labor is serious, but it can be solved only in relation to the whole question of the allocation of man-power.

*

THE FARM BLOC HAS CALLED BYRNES AND Henderson on the carpet because they have allegedly violated the "plain language" of the price law by placing a ceiling on flour that keeps wheat below its parity price. The bloc's quarrel with the price-stabilization authorities appears to be concerned with procedure rather than results. Admittedly the farmer is getting parity price for his wheat through the wheat loans and parity payments. But the farm bloc insists that the payment of a subsidy to farmers to persuade them to liquidate their wheat loans was not authorized by Congress. Granting that the Administration has not followed the specific program of the farm bloc in handling the knotty problem of stabilizing farm prices, we fail to see that it has violated either the letter or the spirit of the law. The Stabilization Act conferred sweeping powers on the President because it was obvious that the price-control technique would have to be kept flexible to deal with a complex situation. The success of Byrnes and Henderson in checking the upward spiral of farm prices after they had advanced some 78 per cent from the pre-war level testifies to the soundness of their policies.

Battle of November 3

ON THE night of November 3 they will start counting the ballots. The elections of 1942, which the Patterson-McCormick press and the hate-Roosevelt demagogues predicted would never come to pass, will be an accomplished fact; the democratic machinery which was scheduled to come to a fatal standstill with the declaration of war will have functioned as usual. And anyone who minimizes the implications of that functioning is dangerously innocent of what is going on about him. For by the morning of November 4 the pattern of American history for the years ahead will to a large degree be determined, whether or not its outlines are altogether clear.

A war-time election in its very nature constitutes what Carl Sandburg called "the shaping of a national fate." Who can doubt that this would have been a very different country had the Copperheads carried the day against Lincoln in November of 1862, or that the world itself might have presented a different face if Woodrow Wilson had not lost caste in November of 1918? Yet neither of those campaigns carried more dynamite than is packed into the election of 1942.

There is admittedly a widespread disposition to shrug this election off and fix one's gaze on 1944. But the world is moving at an incredible pace. When the present Congress was chosen, France had just fallen, Russia was still shipping war materials to Germany, England had had its first taste of the blitz, the United States was promising to keep its boys at home, and the cause of democracy looked black as pitch. The vast changes that have taken place in these two years will probably pale into invisibility beside the upheavals of the next two. By 1944 the war may be over, or in any event drawing to a close. The nature of the peace, the shape of things to come, may well lie with the men who are chosen next Tuesday. The Seventy-eighth Congress will be in a position to do to Roosevelt what the Sixty-sixth did to Wilson. It will do that and worse if it is not relieved of the small-minded men who in the Seventy-seventh have brought Congressional prestige to an all-time low. The men who would have stripped this country of power in the moment of its greatest need now ask that their pre-Pearl Harbor records be forgotten in the name of a "unity" which they work seven days a week to undermine. We can only hope that the American people will understand that the elimination of these men is a matter not of revenge but of necessity.

We have devoted a great deal of space in the pages of *The Nation* to analyzing the performance of our Congressmen and we present elsewhere in this issue a round-up of some of the Dunderheads who escaped full-

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length portraits in the "Keep Them Out" series. Other aspects of the campaign are worth touching on, however, even at this late date.

The Republican candidate for Senator in Massachusetts is Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who sided with the isolationists on every issue except the Lend-Lease bill, for which he voted after having spoken against it. Since Pearl Harbor Senator Lodge has of course supported the war. But one group at least is not impressed by his change of front. That group is the Coughlinites. On September 26, 1942, the *Gaelic American,* of which Father Curran is a regular columnist, called upon all who share its opinion that "American isolationist" is synonymous with "American patriot" to rally their forces behind Senator Lodge, who, it maintained, will be opposed by "every anti-Irish bigot, every Irish renegade, every Communist" in Massachusetts. Now it happens that Senator Lodge is also opposed by Representative Joseph E. Casey, Democratic candidate for Lodge's Senate seat. Mr. Casey's name would scarcely suggest that he is the "slavish Anglophile" which the *Gaelic American* has been painting him. What disturbs this organ of the Coughlinites is that Casey voted for repealing the arms embargo, for extending the draft law, for the strategic-materials bill, and for repealing the Neutrality Act—all of which measures were opposed by Lodge. Massachusetts citizens who do not believe that isolationist and patriot are really synonymous will have an excellent chance to express their opinion next Tuesday by voting for Casey.

LeRoy D. Downs, Democratic candidate for reelection as Representative from Fairfield County, the Fourth Congressional District of Connecticut, is opposed by the resplendent Clare Luce, author, playwright, wife of Henry Luce, and free-lance commentator on world affairs. Mrs. Luce has ungraciously labeled her rival a faceless man and a rubber stamp. As a matter of fact his record, both on war measures and domestic issues, has been excellent. Organized labor is solidly behind him, and voters in general will do well to keep him in office. Mrs. Luce's views on foreign affairs and how to win the war are vigorous enough, but her recent remark that at one time "we all thought that Mussolini was doing a good job" is a pretty typical example of her precocious political confusion.

Our sympathies go out to New Jersey voters who face the Senatorial alternative of Albert G. Hawkes or the Democratic incumbent, William H. Smathers. Hawkes, a former president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, makes no bones about his plutocratic bias, and Senator Smathers is too much a Hague candidate for us to indorse him with pleasure. He has consistently supported the Administration, however, and is without doubt the better bet.

An overwhelmingly hostile press is hampering Governor Culbert L. Olson in his campaign for reelection against the "non-partisan" candidacy of Earl Warren. Olson has disappointed some of his more radical supporters, but his term as governor of California has been marked by major reforms, notably in farm-labor conditions. It would be a pity to have California revert to the Hoover-Merriam era, which is where Warren would take it despite his current pro-Roosevelt pretensions. In the same state Private Will Rogers, Jr., carries with him the blessing of progressives of all shades, not only for his own sake, though he is a gallant and promising liberal, but because his victory will remove the ineffable Leland Ford from Capitol Hill.

Jumping about the map, we should like to put in a good word for Senator Murray, up for reelection in Montana, and for the peerless George Norris, who despite the President's indorsement faces a stiff three-cornered fight in Nebraska. Senator Brown of Michigan has made a good record and deserves reelection. Most of the House delegation from that state is Republican, and it is one of the most viciously reactionary groups that ever sat in Congress. We hope especially for the defeat of Hoffman and Dondero, though the disappearance of the whole bloc would be a blessing to the country.

Elsewhere in this issue is a competent analysis of the intricate and highly strategic campaign in the state of New York. It took courage and farsightedness on the part of the American Labor Party to keep Dean Alfange in the field after the President's second indorsement of John J. Bennett for governor. The need of a second blessing is indicative of both the desperation of the Farley forces and the grudging nature of the first benediction. We hope New Yorkers will not be fooled by the hysterical last-minute contention that a vote against Bennett will be grist to the mill of Dr. Goebbels. It is better to let the Nazi propaganda machine make what it can of a spurious defeat for the President in 1942 than to present it with a genuine overthrow of Roosevelt in 1944. And make no mistake about it, that is exactly what a Bennett victory would mean.

What's Wrong in the Pacific?

THE struggle in the Solomons has become symbolic as well as strategic. Our toehold on Guadalcanal represents our pledge of aggressive action to carry the war northward and regain the wide spaces overrun by the enemy; the magnitude of the forces Japan has brought to bear in the area is a measure of its determination to hang on to every inch of territory won and to halt our counter-offensive at the base-line.

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As we go to press, the first news has been received of a developing battle of all arms. A Japanese communiqué has hailed a major victory, but its claims that four Allied carriers and a warship have been sunk are dismissed by Secretary Knox as "a fishing expedition." Our Navy Department, however, has admitted some losses in addition to the sinking of the Wasp, including major damage to a carrier; and in view of our apparent numerical inferiority in surface craft in the Solomons area, the situation is not entirely reassuring. Our biggest asset remains the qualitative, if not quantitative, superiority of our air forces, but the value of this asset is likely to be diminished during the coming rainy season.

In these circumstances the new American commander in the Solomons, Rear Admiral William F. Halsey, has a tough assignment. Moreover, he has problems to solve within the American forces; past weaknesses to overcome and past mistakes to be rectified. The nature of these mistakes and weaknesses is set forth in an illuminating series of articles by Hanson W. Baldwin now appearing in the New York *Times*. Mr. Baldwin has recently returned from an extensive tour of the Pacific, including a visit to Guadalcanal. He is among the more sober of our military commentators, and his articles have presumably been subjected to censorship. The charges they make, therefore, of incompetence and divided control cannot be lightly dismissed.

The major problem to be solved in the Pacific, according to Mr. Baldwin, is that of leadership. Errors of judgment by some of our naval commanders—"errors that stem in large measure from over-caution and the defensive complex"—have, he declares, resulted in costly and unnecessary losses. The outstanding instance of such errors is, of course, the disaster that occurred off Savo Island on August 9 when the Australian cruiser Canberra and three of our heavy cruisers "were surprised like sitting ducks." According to Mr. Baldwin, the surprise was due to the fact that although warning of the approach of a Japanese cruiser squadron had been received, our ships had assumed defensive stations patrolling over a fixed course instead of going out to meet the enemy. Moreover, their dispositions were such that the Japanese vessels were able to approach almost within range before being detected. In addition, it appears that only a small part of the crews of our ships were at battle stations, and that the admiral in command of the cruiser screen had departed in his flagship leaving no one in actual tactical command. If this is a true picture of the engagement off Savo Island, it suggests an almost incredible degree of carelessness.

This blow helps to explain why the first brilliant success of the marines in the Solomons was not followed through aggressively and accounts also for the unusual and drastic step of a change of leadership in the middle of operations. Admiral Halsey, who succeeds Admiral Ghormley in this command, is reported to be an aggressive, two-fisted officer, and as chief of a combined force he has the advantage of training at the Army War College as well as the Naval War College. The public, however will not be satisfied by this chopping off of a head unless it speedily receives evidence that the fundamental weaknesses of our fighting organization are corrected.

It is shocking, for instance, to receive from Mr. Baldwin confirmation of sinister rumors of a continued rivalry between the services that has been definitely hurtful to morale. We cannot win a war in "the Franklin Field mentality," and it is high time pre-war football feuds were forgotten. Mr. Baldwin reports that on Guadalcanal the three services have been cooperating very well, but that at greater distances from the front there has been ridiculous bickering over credits, particularly between the navy and the army air forces.

We can hardly expect unity in the ranks, however, so long as we fail to solve the problem of unity at the top. In common with many other organs of public opinion *The Nation* has repeatedly inveighed against the divided rule under which our war machine operates. In every field—military, economic, political—the war effort is entangled in the stalemates and contradictions that arise from conflicting authority. Between the United Nations and within our own nation, this problem persists; and success waits upon its solution.

Defending the Empire?

DEAR FREDA: I am quite startled by the last paragraph on page 365 of *The Nation* of October 17. You cannot mean—can you?—that we are fighting for the British Empire. We are fighting to keep the territories of the British Empire out of Axis hands. But where are our war aims (freedom) if we wish to keep the British Empire intact? I thought Sumner Welles said, "The period of imperialism is ended."

The task of keeping British Empire territory out of Axis hands would have been facilitated in Burma, for instance, if stupid imperialist policy had not prevailed. The defense of India would be easier for us if Churchillism were abandoned. I think we *can* spare the British Empire. It is obstructing victory. British imperialists are responsible for England's conservative conduct of the war.

LOUIS FISCHER

Canton, Ohio, October 22

DEAR LOUIS: After reading your letter I reread the offending paragraph in my editorial—and I must say I think you have a rather low startling-point.

Here's what I said:

> And meanwhile the British people needn't worry. We'll keep on fighting along with them in spite of

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> *Life's* ultimatum. And we'll fight for the empire, too, since the empire includes not only India but the great self-governing dominions, and the islands of the Caribbean, and Malta, and other sources of the power and will-to-win of the alliance against Hitler. We can't spare the British Empire; everybody knows that, really; even Mr. Luce.

Is that a startling statement? Isn't it almost crudely self-evident that, whatever may be done after the war to reorganize the relationships between nations, we are today fighting for the life of the British Empire as well as for our own life? To pretend otherwise is to fool ourselves. The British Empire is a fact—slightly frayed around the edges but still fairly substantial—and we can't sensibly write it out of existence at the same time that we fight on seven seas and half a dozen continents side by side with its armies and fleets.

And it isn't territory alone that is at stake. You know that. The most important asset the empire brings us is the bond of mutual responsibility that holds together the leading nations that make it up. It wasn't a pure passion for democracy in the abstract that drove Canada and Australia and New Zealand and South Africa to declare war in 1939. Even less was it fear of attack. The dominions were no more immediately threatened than the United States. But they went to war voluntarily more than two years before Pearl Harbor pitched us into the fight. They went to war because they were bound to Britain by ties—emotional, political, economic—strong enough to make them send their sons to die on battlefields halfway around the globe. The British Empire—would you feel happier if I called it Commonwealth?—was the only working system of collective security in the world when the war started.

Of course it wasn't perfect and not all of its parts worked. One of the free nations of the empire—the Irish Free State—remained neutral, and today is so completely out from under British control that it even refuses the use of its ports as bases for the defense of the British Isles, itself included. And the British government respects Ireland's reckless neutrality as it did that of Holland and Belgium. At the other end of the imperial arc, India was declared into the war without the assent of its people and has responded with a display of resistance that threatens the whole Allied position in the East.

The truth is, the British Empire is a set of contradictions, and anybody can draw from it almost any moral he chooses. Where it works well, it is a mighty web of useful voluntary relationships—a possible basis for broader federation after the war. Where it works badly, it is a coercive machine, almost useless from a military point of view and actively dangerous politically. But it is foolish to suppose that in the midst of a desperate, round-the-world war the contradictions can be undone and a smooth, consistent structure created. The best that can be hoped for is an interim patching of the fabric of empire where it has worn thin, so that the strength of the whole will not be fatally impaired. It's too late to do a temporary repair job on Malaya or Burma—unless they should be speedily reconquered. But India is still unconquered, and every effort should be made to establish there a sense of confidence and common destiny before India, too, disintegrates under the fire of political as well as military attack. I am convinced that a free India within the empire will be a far better ally than a sullen, half-colonial India divided emotionally by its hatred of Axis tyranny and its desire to see British power overthrown. I am convinced that if India is freed, democratic elements throughout the world will be strengthened—in England as well as elsewhere.

It is not because I am against the empire that I believe India should be given a convincing measure of self-government. It is because I want the empire to be strengthened in its weakest spots—which are its colonial territories—and because I believe that the general fight for freedom is compromised by fights for freedom within the anti-Axis coalition.

And that is why *Life,* when it lectured the British people about "your side" as opposed to "our side," was talking dangerous and almost treasonable nonsense. "Our side" includes the British Empire, just as it includes China and Russia and the guerrillas in Serbia and the Fighting French in Syria and Equatorial Africa. Our side—America included—is riddled with contradictions, sins against freedom, treason to the democratic spirit. Oppression, race prejudice, autocratic rule are no monopoly of the British Empire; it harbors less of these than many of the rest of us. We can't draw our skirts aside and wait till injustice is ended and empire reconstructed into brotherhood. We have a war to fight. And our side has to be united in all our faults and virtues or we shall face defeat together. So Americans can ill afford to mutter vague threats about refusing to fight if the British don't "move over to our side." They are already on our side, and they were there long before we were, if you'll forgive the paradox.

What we can do, and must do, since the empire and we are full partners with each other and all the rest of the United Nations, is to share also the responsibility of repairing any weak spots that diminish our fighting force. The Indian problem is at one remove an American problem, and a Russian and Chinese problem. The mechanics of bringing about a settlement through the good offices of all the interested powers is difficult. But the difficulty is similar to that involved in working out the other problems of political strategy that affect the war effort throughout the world. To overcome it will take both tact and toughness. I hope we have them.

FREDA KIRCHWEY

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Washington's Forbidden Topic

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, October 25

I WANT to call attention to an extraordinary document that seems to have been completely overlooked by the daily press. I refer to the "Additional Comments" of Representative Bender which are appended to the report on man-power issued by the Tolan committee last Tuesday. Bender is a Republican Congressman-at-large from Ohio. He was first elected to Congress in 1938 and only recently became a member of the Tolan committee. Little is known of him, and that little gives no indication that he differs much from the average Middle Western Republican. All "Who's Who" reveals is: "Pres. George H. Bender Ins. Co.; editor and publisher the *Ohio Republican* and the *National Republican* since 1934; mem. Ohio State Senate, 1920-30; pres. Ohio Fedn. of Rep. Clubs; chmn. Rep. Central Com. of Cuyahoga County." This certainly smacks of Main Street, and it is as a Main Streeter that Bender chooses to speak in his "Additional Comments," which are really a separate and sharper minority report. "Since the winter of 1941," he declares, "it has been clear to every Main Street American that what is needed is a second front in Europe to split the Axis forces. Spring, summer, and fall have come and gone without a second front."

Representative Bender's advocacy of a second front is less important than his courage in being the first public figure here to speak out in plain language on the deeper issue behind the question of a second front. This is not whether we are to open an offensive in France next Tuesday or next month or next spring. The real question is whether we are to plan this as a war of the United Nations, with a Western offensive geared into the supply needs of the British, Russians, and Chinese, or whether we are to plan to fight the world alone. The truth is, as every important official here knows, that the President's dominant military-naval advisers are already operating on this latter assumption. The corollaries of this assumption are (1) the addition of several million men to our army, (2) the curtailment of lend-lease aid to our allies in order to outfit that army, and (3) postponement of the offensive until the enlarged army is ready. All three corollaries are already reflected in official action, and informed persons here say that the plan is to stage no real large-scale offensive in 1943.

The Bender report is a hard-hitting six-page summary of the basic man-power, military, and production problems facing us in this war. The full committee report is the ablest and most comprehensive analysis of war needs and war planning ever to appear here, and I hope to discuss it in some detail in my next article. The value of Mr. Bender's "Additional Comments" is that they bring some of the points in the full report into sharper focus. "Our military," Bender says, "have never decided when, where, and with what they are going to fight. For this reason they have not and cannot give to the War Production Board and to the War Manpower Commission, respectively, schedules of their requirements for military products and man-power. Without these schedules it has been impossible to plan production, to allocate materials and man-power. And because we have not planned the elements of production, we cannot manage or control the flow of armament. Without such scheduled flow of weapons the military cannot undertake to plan its strategy." The result of this vicious circle is that "we are always on the defensive." And now we are really preparing to dig in on the defensive on a gigantic scale.

Will the reader bear with me while I quote more fully from that passage in which Representative Bender touches upon the capital's most important Forbidden Topic? "At the present time," Bender writes, "the army is demanding a huge increase in man-power." A fantastically high proportion of present production now goes to supply ordinary civilian items for our present army. "When the army is asked," Bender continues, "if it expects to obtain trucks and other equipment in the same proportion to this larger army as it now obtains, no answer is forthcoming." Why do we need an army and navy of about 10,000,000 men? "*The demand by the military for a huge army,*" Bender answers, "*is based in part on the assumption that one or more of our allies will collapse in the coming year.* Upon this assumption, it is then argued that we can rely only on ourselves." Since the Tolan report went to press, Secretary Stimson has cut his estimate to 7,500,000 men, but a continuation of the present defensive and defeatist strategic thinking will make necessary an army much larger than that, perhaps as large as 13,000,000.

"To equip such an army with training weapons alone," Bender goes on, "would require practically all of our present war production. Therefore, these advocates of a huge army move logically to the next point—the reduction or stoppage of lend-lease shipments to our allies." By assuming the defeat of our allies we are compelled vastly to enlarge the army. By mobilizing a vastly larger army we help to insure their defeat. "When it is pointed out to these advocates of a 13,000,000-man army," Bender says, "that our allies may collapse if we stop lend-

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lease shipments, they have no answer"—that is, no answer that could safely be made in public.

Behind these defeatist calculations are a complex of considerations and motives. Among them are not merely political dislike for the Soviet Union but considerable elements of anti-British feeling. As deep, if not deeper, than the more obvious anti-Soviet feeling, which wide sectors of our leadership and upper classes have overcome, is a kind of anti-British isolationist-imperialist attitude on the part of some of our foremost military men. An important man in this category is General Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the Services of Supply, the most powerful single figure in war production today and a man who has done his best to cut down lend-lease aid to Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. He feels that we have to "prepare to do the job ourselves."

This kind of thinking would make the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards our first lines of defense. It would cost many millions more in lives and many billions more in money. It means that we would have to defeat the Axis with our men and boys alone instead of with the aid of British, Russians, and Chinese. It would leave them to die in vain rather than as part of a world strategy for victory. "The international implications of army demands for man-power," Bender points out, "are seldom understood. But they are as important as the need to consider man-power requirements of industry and agriculture." It is these broader implications which the dominant military have failed to understand or chosen to ignore. Popular pressure is needed to support the efforts of powerful forces here, including I believe the President himself, to combat this dangerous trend. The moment is approaching when it will be decided whether these are indeed to be United Nations fighting a United Nations war, or each waging its own struggle in desperate and foolhardy isolation.

1942 and 1944

BY DAVID DUBINSKY

EVEN the least alert voter can hardly fail to realize that a victory for Thomas E. Dewey in this year's campaign for the governorship of New York will be an irresistible Dewey bid for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1944. And it must be equally clear to him that a Bennett victory will represent a smashing blow to the New Deal and a popular indorsement of Farley's anti-Roosevelt drive which will have a decisive effect on the Democratic choice for President two years hence. In view of these simple and inescapable conclusions, the drop in registration throughout the state this year cannot be explained by general political apathy or by a lack of important issues. Behind the candidates —Bennett, Dewey, and Alfange—there are in fact far-reaching issues.

During the past ten years, since President Roosevelt rose to the leadership of the Democratic Party, the progressives have controlled the party nationally and in many of the states. This leadership saved our economic system after the 1929 catastrophe, and by the adoption of a series of progressive measures, popularly known as the New Deal, it provided the underprivileged of our nation with a measure of economic security and gave the workers a new "bill of rights."

The New Deal leadership, of course, did not receive the support of the tories in the Democratic Party, who on numerous occasions worked hand in hand with the Republicans to emasculate or defeat the humanitarian measures sponsored by the Roosevelt Administration. The political victories and the patronage which President Roosevelt's popularity brought the party prevented a permanent rift between its progressive and reactionary wings. Nevertheless, the reactionary group did everything it could to discredit the New Deal and to regain control of the party.

The struggle came out into the open two years ago. Led by Postmaster General Farley, the reactionary Democrats tried to defeat President Roosevelt for the renomination. The pretext, of course, was that they were opposed to breaking the "sacred" third-term tradition. Actually, they were trying to scuttle the New Deal leadership. But in 1940 the Democratic tories lost the battle. Roosevelt was renominated and reelected, and the New Deal for the second time won national vindication.

But while reactionary politicians may die, they never surrender. Since 1940 Mr. Farley and his associates have been building the base for the restoration of bourbon control of the Democratic Party at the 1944 national convention. New York, the largest state in the nation, is the first they have set out to capture. The outcome of the election here can materially influence the fight in other states, where Farley has already been at work.

That the major fight in New York State is between the New Deal forces, which supported Senator Mead for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination, and the anti-New Deal forces was made dramatically evident when the delegates to the Democratic State Convention repeatedly booed and hissed President Roosevelt, Gov-

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ernor Lehman, Senators Wagner and Mead, and every mention of the New Deal. Farley succeeded in defeating the New Dealers and in bringing about the nomination of John J. Bennett, an inconspicuous and docile office-holder. Bennett's sponsors rather openly assumed that liberal, labor, and independent voters, who during the past ten years have cooperated with the Democrats because the party was led by outstanding progressives, would continue to go along, and they therefore thought it safe to nominate the colorless Attorney General.

The ultimate purpose of Farley's group, however, is far more serious and ambitious than winning the governorship. Control of New York State would give them an opportunity to gain control of the next National Democratic Convention. If they succeed, the nation will again be confronted as so many times in the past, and in New York State this year, with a choice between two evils. Instead of two parties, one led by the reactionaries and the other by the progressives, we shall have two parties dominated by the same forces, both dedicated to the restoration of special privilege and the nullification of most of the advanced labor and social measures enacted during the past decade.

In the light of this analysis of the forces now at work within the Democratic Party, what are sincere and devoted liberals and trade unionists in New York State to do on November 3, when they must decide between Bennett, Alfange, and Dewey?

It is clear that the most important job before progressive voters is to prevent the reactionaries from having two political parties in 1944 while the progressives have none. The progressives cannot hope to influence the decision of the Republican convention in 1944. Nor should they expect to. The conservatives are entitled to have a political party of their own. The Republican Party has always been their political home. Conservative Democrats could consistently support it, as many of them do already, some openly, others quietly.

However, the progressives can help to maintain liberal control of the Democratic Party. This means that Farley and his group must be beaten, beaten decisively and beaten this year. Defeat will serve notice on him and his associates that the Democratic Party will not abandon its substantial record of liberalism in the national arena and in many of the states during the past ten years; that it will continue to follow the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt and not of Jim Farley.

There is more at stake this year than the continuation of the New Deal program. The war in which we are engaged will, we hope, have ended in victory for the United Nations in 1944 or a year later. Important problems must be solved in the post-war period—the terms of peace and reconstruction measures.

The appeasers, the defeatists, and the isolationists have been temporarily silenced by the necessities of war. But they are far from dead. They will attempt to destroy the hopes of mankind again, just as they did in 1919 and 1920. Are we to be confronted with a Harding on the Republican ticket and a Farley-picked candidate on the Democratic ticket? If so, even though we may have won the war we shall have lost the peace.

That is why the issues of 1944 are directly involved in the election of a governor this year. By their choice this year the voters in New York will help determine what happens in 1944.

Two other things continue to perplex independent voters honestly groping for a solution of the problem they face on November 3. One of them is their anxiety lest in defeating Bennett they may elect Dewey, who may become the Republican Presidential candidate in 1944. Liberals are agreed that the Republicans will nominate a conservative in 1944. Whether it is Dewey, or Taft, or Vandenberg hardly matters. It is obvious that Wendell Willkie, for example, who has taken a liberal position on many domestic and foreign issues, has no chance of nomination by the Republicans. Whoever is nominated is certain, therefore, to be an enemy of the New Deal.

The other source of doubt is President Roosevelt's indorsement of Bennett. This indorsement, made in response to frantic appeals by the same state leaders who ignored the President's views prior to the nomination of Bennett, may prove confusing to some liberal voters. The situation, nevertheless, is quite simple. The President did what is normally expected of the titular head of a party—indorsed its candidates. But the fact remains that Roosevelt, Lehman, Wagner, and Mead, all forcefully opposed Bennett's nomination. And the President openly predicted that Bennett could not win.

The President's statement that he does not believe in "protest voting" is not likely to impress the large liberal following of the Labor Party. The rank and file of the party, like its leaders, see nothing wrong in "protest" voting. It was protest voting by the great independent mass of voters in this city which took New York out of the hands of Tammany for keeps in 1933, and "protest" voting also achieved some excellent results for the New Deal, nationally and in this state, in 1936, 1938, 1940—and let us hope it will in 1942 as well. What is even more important, a vote for Dean Alfange is not just a protest vote. It is a positive and constructive vote to preserve the tradition of liberalism in New York State and give labor a voice in the affairs of our state and nation.

It is important not only that Bennett be defeated but that the vote of the American Labor Party and its standard bearer, Dean Alfange, be tremendous. Alfange is a New Deal Democrat—an outspoken advocate of liberal and humanitarian causes and a fervent apostle of democracy. A huge vote for him and his fellow-candi-

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dates on the American Labor Party ticket will demonstrate beyond question that there is a strong liberal force in this state without which a Democratic candidate cannot win. If the American Labor Party, which four years ago carried the state for Lehman and two years ago carried it for Roosevelt, can continue to hold a determining balance of power on Election Day, its position in the state as the exponent of Roosevelt's policies and of the New Deal will continue to command respect.

Independent voters owe no allegiance to the Democratic Party as such. They do owe their support to the New Deal, which has so greatly benefited the country socially and economically. By joining with the American Labor Party in its efforts to strengthen the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, liberals and independent voters will be helping to bring about the much hoped-for political realignment in America.

All progressive voters, those in the Republican and Democratic parties as well as in the Labor Party, should unite behind Dean Alfange, the candidate of forward-looking men and women and the spokesman in New York State of those who seek a constructive solution to our social and economic problems and a democratic peace when victory has been won.

Keep Them Out!

IX. OUR WORST CONGRESSMEN

BY WILL CHASAN

THE demoralization of Congress, so disturbingly evident in recent months, is primarily the work of a small group of tory zealots, some of them near-fascists, whose demagogy and cynicism have fostered a wilful disregard of national interest. These men, probably among the worst ever to sit in the national legislature, are divided by party labels but united by their bitterness toward the New Deal and an essentially undemocratic outlook. Their fierce prejudices and unrestrained malice have put Congress in a thoroughly unwholesome mood and made it an irritating burden rather than a help in the present emergency.

Obviously not every isolationist or anti-New Dealer belongs in this group. It includes only the extremists: the shabby minority which has indorsed Hitler's *Lebensraum* claims and worked with his agents and American counterparts; the conscious obstructionists, only slightly less objectionable, who charged the outbreak of war to British imperialism, disparaged the menace of fascism, and denounced every preparedness measure as an effort by Roosevelt to enlarge his powers; and finally those who supported New Deal foreign policy because it was politically expedient to do so but have used the national emergency as a pretext for broadsides against New Deal domestic policy. The records of eight notorious members of this group—Representatives Hamilton Fish, Clare E. Hoffman, Martin L. Sweeney, Stephen A. Day, and Martin Dies, and Senators C. Wayland Brooks and W. Lee O'Daniel—have already been examined in *Nation* articles, but many others who are up for reelection this November deserve special mention.

Harold Knutson, Minnesota Republican, was vice-chairman of Hamilton Fish's National Committee to Keep America Out of War, cited in recent federal sedition proceedings as a transmission belt for Nazi propaganda. His views have a distinctly fascist tinge. He has praised Hitler for his "forbearance," suggested that the Nazi form of government is superior to the British, and characterized the war as one merely for a raw-material market. "The have-not nations," he told Congress before Pearl Harbor, "must either have free and equal access to that market or they will perish." Knutson shares at least one Nazi race theory. As far back as 1924, in discussing an immigration bill, he said, "Of all the fallacies, I think the one which assumes that all races are equal is the most fallacious." Besides opposing the Administration's foreign policy, he has fought most of its domestic measures, voted for drastic restrictions on labor, and diligently harassed New Deal agencies. His franked envelopes have been available to at least one Coughlinite organization. His speeches have been quoted generously in *Social Justice,* the Geneva *Herald,* and other pro-fascist publications. Pearl Harbor left him impenitent. Last March he inquired, "Will Americans graciously bow down to all totalitarian decrees which will restrict their sugar, their motor cars, their oil . . . simply to satisfy the ambitions of those who understand victory to be the overthrow of their enemies?"

John E. Rankin, Mississippi Democrat, has supported New Deal foreign policy and fought for public power, but the Reichstag would provide a more suitable environment than Congress for his unvarnished intolerance. He is anti-Semitic and anti-Negro. Last year he told the House that "the international bankers, largely international Jews" were "crucifying civilization on a cross of gold." Several months before Pearl Harbor he

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said, "Wall Street and a little group of our international Jewish brethren are still attempting to harass the President of the United States and the Congress of the United States into plunging us into war unprepared." Rankin, probably the most violent anti-Negro Representative in Congress, protested against a measure to end discrimination against Negroes in public places in the District of Columbia on the ground that it would encourage assaults on white women. In opposing a recent bill to allow soldiers to vote without paying a poll tax, he warned that "representative government is trembling in the balance." He has voted against price-control legislation, for the inflationary farm-parity amendment, and for restrictive labor legislation. He is against the forty-hour week, and he opposed the original wage-hour law because, he said, it would "destroy individual liberty." Despite his stand on foreign policy and public power, he is an economic tory and a racial and religious bigot.

George Anthony Dondero, Michigan Republican, has his physical and ideological home in Royal Oak, center of the Coughlin movement. Shortly before Pearl Harbor Dondero assured Congress that "no nation on earth—not even Germany—has threatened the peace and security of our country," although we had "irritated and committed deliberate acts of unneutrality which would warrant Germany or Italy to declare war against us." He decried the presence in the Administration of men "notorious for their socialistic theories," and said, "Within our gates, and not without, lies the greatest danger to our American system of government and way of life." Dondero has opposed both the New Deal's foreign policy and its domestic program. He described the TVA as "one of the greatest swindles ever perpetrated on the American people," voted against the wage-hour law and other social legislation, and urged Congress to take action against "professional agitators" who seek to "impugn" the motives of business men. His post-Pearl Harbor record has been consistently bad. He voted for the inflationary farm bill and against needed tax legislation. He disapproved of restriction of automobile production. He wants to abolish the forty-hour week, time and a half for overtime, and the Farm Security Administration, and thinks that all social gains ought to be abandoned in the interest of our defense program. "One dictator nation," he said, "has demonstrated to the world how to build national defense. It was not done by social reforms or social gains." Dondero has inserted material from *Social Justice* in the *Congressional Record* and has been quoted by Coughlin's paper in turn.

James E. Van Zandt, Pennsylvania Republican, active in America First and an admirer of Hamilton Fish, has persistently tried to convince the country that the German war machine is invincible. On May 14, 1941, according to the New York *Herald Tribune*, he gave an America First rally at Brooklyn a "hair-raising description" of the German army, and said that if we entered the war we would share the fate of the small Balkan nations. In Congress he talked of Germany's "powerful forces" and "blitzkrieg victories" and cautioned against any effort against them. He opposed the seizure of German and Italian ships in American ports. He contended that under lease-lend Roosevelt could "literally take the clothes off your back," and he has used similar arguments against other phases of the Administration's foreign policy. His speeches have been reprinted in *Roll Call* and *America in Danger*, both named in federal sedition actions. He has placed in the *Congressional Record* articles by Lawrence Dennis, one of our better-known fascists, and Catherine Curtis, whose organization, the Women's National Committee to Keep America Out of War, has also been named in a federal sedition action. He has voted against most New Deal measures, saying of one that it gave Roosevelt as much power as the law authorizing Hitler's dictatorship.

William Purnell Lambertson, Kansas Republican, calls the New Deal "a system of planned sabotage by subterfuge for the destruction of the recognized American way." Lambertson's own conception of the American way is illustrated by a speech in which he said, "In the old days when breaking wild horses from Wyoming, it was common to put buckshot fish-line sinkers in their ears when they balked," and went on to suggest "similar treatment of defense strikers." In another speech he declared, "If there is one thing we could honestly do to help this country, it would be to dehydrate the labor standards of New York City." Lambertson opposed wage-hour legislation, the WPA, and other phases of the New Deal domestic program. His attitude toward preparedness was expressed unequivocally in Congress. "This hysteria about national defense," he said, "is hooey, and I am ready to stake my political future on that proposition." He charged that the declaration of a national emergency was a ruse to assure the reelection of Roosevelt, and he has repeatedly accused the Administration of seeking to return the United States to the British Empire. His speeches have been full of subtle anti-Semitism, and he has quoted from Walter Steele, leader of the American Coalition. In the summer of 1941 he urged a negotiated peace, berating those who were encouraging England and France to continue the war. Lambertson now holds that we "were maneuvered" into the conflict. He has continued to oppose the war program.

Howard W. Smith, Virginia Democrat, is a tireless labor-baiter and a leader of the Southern tory ring. Generally he has supported New Deal foreign policy, but last November, at a crucial moment, he insisted that Roosevelt "quell the labor insurrection with its violence and bloodshed" as a condition for further support. Smith has introduced a whole series of anti-labor bills designed

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to "regulate" labor unions out of existence. As a member of the House Rules Committee he has worked with Hamilton Fish and other tories to tie up New Deal measures. He voted against the bill to allow men in the services to vote without paying a poll tax, and he has opposed every other measure to extend at home the democracy for which he asks others to fight abroad.

John M. Robsion, Kentucky Republican, regards New Deal foreign policy as a product of Roosevelt's "personal quarrel" with Hitler. He has opposed all preparedness measures, repeating the familiar Coughlinite line that "the great threat to our country does not come from forces across the seas. If this nation ever falls, it will be because of the enemies within the gates." He objected to the admission of refugee children because it would violate the immigration laws. He has objected to sending troops and munitions to England and to sending aid to Russia. He is the author of the tactful suggestion that "we should load all these alien criminal Russian Communists on ships and send them back to Russia," and tell Stalin that unless he "accepts these criminal aliens . . . we will refuse to give him money and munitions for war." His record on domestic legislation is almost uniformly bad. He voted for restrictive labor legislation and against price control. He is a staunch friend of the Dies committee and has criticized the President for failing to cooperate with it. His speeches have turned up from time to time in the fascist press.

Dewey Short, Missouri Republican, is a loud and rabid critic of the New Deal. Typical of his style of expression are his description of the NRA blue eagle as the "blue buzzard" and his suggestion that Roosevelt permit Ferdinand the Bull to draft executive messages to Congress. He thought the spilling of "a little blood" would solve the sitdown strikes in 1937, and he has backed the most drastic labor bills. He used to oppose any participation in the League of Nations and was violently isolationist in the recent foreign-policy debate. When Willkie came out for aid to England, Short called him a "Janus, vindictive, intolerant, bigoted, conceited, utterly unfit to be a leader of any party . . . [a] bellowing, blatant, bellicose, belligerent, bombastic blowhard." His attitude toward the European war was simple. "It was Great Britain and France," he said, "who declared war upon the German Reich after being clearly forewarned by Colonel Lindbergh that it would be utterly impossible for them to compete with Germany's air force." He spoke often for America First and was on the executive council of the National Committee to Keep America Out of War.

Lewis D. Thill, Wisconsin Republican, is the one man in Congress who has been so indiscreet as to insert in the *Congressional Record* material from a publication of the German Library of Information. He has also inserted articles from the Brooklyn *Tablet* and the New York *Enquirer*. He wrote to the Coughlinite Mothers Mobilizing Against War, "I cannot too highly praise the work your organization is doing in behalf of this country in keeping it out of war." During the foreign-policy debate he had much to say in condemnation of England and Roosevelt, but little about Germany. He has voted with monotonous regularity against New Deal domestic legislation, and he supported the most recent Smith bill to hobble labor unions.

Leland M. Ford, California Republican, sees the New Deal as a Communist plot. He fought the TVA as "socialism," predicted that mandatory joint income-tax returns would lead to the destruction of the family and to communism, and called price control a move by some people "to destroy industry in this country as well as the financial structure of the country in order to accomplish their communistic, socialistic purposes." He regards the C. I. O. as a party to the New Deal plot, and says that it "is destroying the country." He blames the C. I. O. for the fall of Guam, Wake, and the Philippines and alleges that its "main purpose" is to sabotage the defense program. In his anti-labor speeches he often refers to the "Russian-educated" Reuthers and the "Russian revolutionist" Hillman, and compares Murray with the Japanese peace emissaries. Last year he introduced a bill to make striking or inciting to strike on defense work an act of treason punishable by twenty-five years' imprisonment. Mrs. Roosevelt's comment was, "Perfect nonsense." Although Ford has generally supported the New Deal's foreign policy, last November he appealed to the House not to vote further military or lease-lend appropriation "until the Administration had demonstrated its ability at least to lick John Lewis and the C. I. O." He says that labor unions and New Deal social legislation are corrupting our democracy and makes the usual tory analogy with the Blum government in France.

William B. Barry, New York Democrat, thinks Americans were unduly alarmed about Hitler. There is no reason, he said in the House last year, why we cannot "survive in a world where Hitlerism is involved." This belief has led Barry to oppose crucial New Deal foreign-policy measures and to speak frequently for America First and Coughlinite peace groups. He has addressed at least two meetings at which Father Edward Lodge Curran presided. At one of these Father Curran said, "We Christians don't need any help to preserve our Christianity. . . . That great priest in Royal Oak is with us." Barry, in the course of his isolationist activities, inserted in the *Congressional Record* an editorial from the Brooklyn *Tablet* and recommended it to his colleagues as "worth-while reading during the hysterical period through which we are now going." The editorial, undiluted Coughlin propaganda, asked, "Is not Churchill's expediency about the same as Hitler's, Stalin's, and Mussolini's? Is he not as cold-bloodedly anti-Christian

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in violating pledges, in ridiculing ideals, in championing anti-God?" Barry disclaims any association with Coughlinite groups, but in 1941 he was boomed for borough president of Queens by a group of Christian Fronters calling themselves the American Rock. The Brooklyn *Tablet* supports him vigorously.

Roy Orchard Woodruff, Michigan Republican, has opposed every New Deal preparedness measure. He said that the war danger was "manufactured" partly to provide Roosevelt with an excuse for copying the techniques of Hitler and Stalin. He saw this "sinister danger" lurking in the third term and in almost every other Administration act. The lease-lend bill, he said in a speech denouncing it, was "in fact and effect a proposal for the setting up of a dictatorship in the United States, with the President as dictator." He attributed defense strikes to a government plot to socialize industry. He objected to the seizure of German and Italian ships in American ports and more vehemently to aid to Russia. "We hear," he declared in the House, "that Mr. Hopkins is in Moscow clasping the bloody hand of the Russian dictator, Joe Stalin." He read into the *Congressional Record* a statement by Gerald L. K. Smith—whom he described as "the great leader and national chairman of the Committee of One Million"—which asserted that any lease-lend aid to Russia would be "the underwriting of atheistic communism." Last March he placed in the record an editorial from Smith's *The Cross and the Flag:* "The most serious thing about this crucifixion of the middle class [by the war effort] is not only the fact that our bureaucrats apparently don't care what happens to these people but they actually appear to delight in their annihilation." Woodruff himself saw "sinister conditions back of this rubber-gasoline mystery." Pearl Harbor had no perceptible influence on his views. He opposed automobile and tire freezing, he voted for the inflationary farm-parity amendment, and he has continued to hamper the war program. He has been quoted in *Broom* and *Publicity* and praised in *The Cross and the Flag.*

These men are our worst Congressmen. Others whose activities in Congress have been almost equally harmful are Eugene Cox, the Georgia Democrat whose labor-baiting is notorious; Clifton A. Woodrum, the Virginia Democrat who leads the House economy bloc; Paul W. Shafer and Fred Bradley, Michigan Republicans who follow the lead of Clare Hoffman; Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota Republican who was active in America First and has expressed pro-fascist sentiments; John M. Vorys, Ohio Republican who favored a negotiated peace; James F. O'Connor, the Montana Democrat who is Senator Wheeler's satellite; and John Taber, New York Republican, who has fulminated against almost every aspect of the New Deal, including the establishment of a Roosevelt library at Hyde Park. This does not exhaust the list of Congressmen who deserve to be defeated, but it is a guide to those whose continued presence in Congress would be a positive menace to the country's welfare. They are men with tarnished motives or small minds. They have impeded the war effort, and one dreads to think of how they may affect the peace.

Reunion on the Left

BY RALPH BATES

IF ASKED to give reasons for the pre-war appeasement policies of London and Paris, nine out of ten American students of foreign affairs would mention fear and suspicion of the U. S. S. R. and the Communist parties. And most of them would probably assume that it was merely the ruling classes that were hostile and suspicious. The view is a simple one and, like most of its kind, dangerous. For it ignores what, after all, is another aspect of the division introduced into the world by the October Revolution. I refer to the hostility that has always existed between the Second and Third Internationals, the two main streams of the working-class political movement.

There is little need at this date to review the facts in detail, and even less need to apportion blame. The tactics and conduct of each body, infuriating as they were to the other, were the necessary consequence of their philosophies, of their stunted and inadequate elaborations of one half of a truth that was really indivisible. Whatever we may think of either the reformist or the revolutionary tactics or of the uses to which they were put, most of us will admit that the great schism broke the force that might have prevented the rise of fascism. There is not a German Social Democrat or a German Communist who does not today perceive that the unrelenting strife between their parties was of service only to Hitler. Every incident of the ceaseless struggle against pre-war reaction illustrated the same fatal phenomenon, even when there was no open clash. There was unity in Loyalist Spain; yet party frictions, increasing as time went on, were a constant drain on the strength of the Republic. It was party hatred and distrust, in this case four-cornered rather than two-sided, which finally gave the traitor Casado his chance to capitalize on war weari-

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ness. In other countries these differences were always present to prevent the full growth of anti-fascist conviction. To a European, at least, the collisions between the two currents and the sheer political incapacity of the two Internationals, as viewed in the light of after events, must always appear as among the contributory causes of the war.

To an American this opinion may seem an exaggeration; and it may be even less easy for American liberals to believe, as I do, that the war is unlikely to throw up any powerful new movement that will rid us of this old torment of disunity. The Labor Party, as Tom Wintringham suggests, may have remained immune to the new sentiment of reform in Britain. The representatives of the Third International may also be unable to win the allegiance of the masses. Yet when the post-war crisis inevitably arrives, the old parties and the trade unions must once again become the instruments of protest. If they do not, the movement for reform will collapse, and we shall sink into despair.

There would be no point in drawing attention to the schism if its continued existence did not so greatly imperil the successful waging of the war as well as the coming peace. I do not, however, pretend that there is any immediate solution. Most certainly this discussion is not the prelude to yet another sterile effort to find an intellectual common ground for the two movements. But the movements may not always remain as they are. While their philosophies cannot be harmonized, the parties themselves are continually being molded by history; so, too, are the temperaments, the traditions, and the classes from which these parties draw their life and strength. The European parties at this moment *are* being molded by circumstances. If the circumstances last long enough, I believe the gap can be closed. It is necessary to bring Socialists of all kinds within one broadly based, yet disciplined, party. I believe that it can be done and that a beginning can be made most easily in England. In point of fact, the first small step has already been taken by the British Labor Party and the British trade-union movement. As the war drives Britain and the U. S. S. R. into closer dependence upon each other, it will be possible to take longer steps. The Anglo-Russian Treaty of June, 1942, if it endures, may at last bring the Internationals together.

II

It is essential to review the past attitude of British Labor toward the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. One great European crisis demands attention first —the one leading to the end of capitalist intervention against the young Soviet state in 1920. It may truthfully be said that had the official British labor movement not prepared a nation-wide general strike against the government in that year, the Soviet Union might not be in existence today. The history of that crisis discloses something of extreme importance about the workings of socialist feeling in Britain. As early as December, 1918, the Labor Party Executive, by no means leftist, began to question the government's policy, but it was not until the militant Miners' Federation, at a special joint conference of the Trades Union Congress and the Labor Party in 1919, introduced a resolution demanding the end of intervention that the delegations had an opportunity to express themselves. On the evil of intervention the members were unanimous, though there was disagreement concerning action.

When, on August 7, 1920, Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, officially threatened the Soviets with war if the Red Army's advance on Warsaw continued, Labor's response was instantaneous. Upon the receipt of party orders great demonstrations occurred all over Great Britain. On the next day the combined movement warned the government that "the whole industrial power of the organized workers will be used to defeat this war." A joint convention of the two wings of the movement was called, and when it met in Westminster four days later, a unanimous decision was taken. At this crowded and blazing convention British Labor pledged itself to resist any and every form of military and naval intervention against the Soviet government.

One decisive orator said, "This question you are called upon to decide today—the willingness to take any action to win world peace—transcends any claim in connection with wages and hours." That was the opinion of Ernest Bevin, now a powerful figure in Churchill's ministry. The following is from the official report of another important speech:

> [The speaker] wanted to know what the party had done in the matter of the war on the Socialist Republic of Russia. They had got to realize that the present war against Russia on the part of this country . . . was not war against Bolshevism or against Lenin but against the international organization of socialism. It was a war against the organization of the trade-union movement itself, and as such should be resisted with the full political and industrial power of the whole trade-union movement.

The speaker was Herbert Morrison, now Britain's Home Secretary, and there was not the slightest obscurity in his words. The chairman of the Party Executive, Cameron, not a leftist, put the matter as bluntly:

> If the day should come when we do take this action . . . we may be compelled to do things that will cause them to abdicate and to tell them that if they cannot run the country in a peaceful and humane manner without interfering with the lives of other nations, we will be compelled, even against the constitution, to chance whether we cannot do something to take the country into our own hands for our own people.

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POLITICAL WAR EDITED BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Twenty Years of Fascism in Italy

ON OCTOBER 28, 1942, Italian fascism celebrates its twentieth anniversary. The March on Rome is supposed to have been the starting-point of a movement which has given a name to modern barbarism. As a matter of fact, the exact date of its birth cannot be determined. Mussolini's movement was an influence in Italian internal affairs long before the March on Rome; and the march itself did not immediately wipe out parliamentary and democratic institutions. The day of Matteoti's assassination would be a more exact date if fascism is to be seen as the unleashing of a bloody terror upon the progressive forces of the people.

Unlike most other political movements, fascism had no well-defined philosophy or ideology. Mussolini himself once said that the core of his doctrine was to be found in his day-by-day policies and writings. Swayed by constantly changing conditions, these writings show no consistent positive line; what consistency they may have is negative—the liquidation of all progressive ideas. Sometimes Mussolini called his movement a translation of the French Revolution into Italian; sometimes he attacked the ideas of the French Revolution as demoralizing and morbid. Sometimes he emphasized the Mediterranean influence in his movement; sometimes he called upon the Prussian ideal of absolute state power.

His foreign policy from the very beginning was aggressive and revisionist. He claimed that Italy had been slighted by the peace treaties, and fooled by the Allies in April, 1915, when the London treaty promised more than Italy subsequently received.

In the first year of its existence Italian fascism made little impression on world opinion. As a unique form of modern government it was considered an Italian internal affair. A British statesman once declared that if he were an Italian he would, of course, be a Fascist. The best propagandists for the new regime were the tourists who visited Italy for a few days or weeks, and who took the blue sky, the beautiful bays, and the hospitable Italian people for special Fascist manifestations. The highways, the clean streets, the lack of beggars, and the official enthusiasm of a small but very vocal portion of the population impressed them. The greater portion were inevitably silent, and tourists cannot understand silent people, especially when they are foreigners.

The tourists gave no thought to the fact that England, the United States, and other democratic countries had not found it necessary to stifle freedom in order to build highways and keep appointments.

Since his was the first totalitarian state in the world, Mussolini encouraged similar movements in other countries. Declaring that his ideology was not a commodity for export, he nevertheless encouraged Hitler in Germany and the fascists in Austria and Hungary. It was his agents who killed the Yugoslav King Alexander and Louis Barthou, the best Foreign Minister of France, in Marseilles and the Rosselli brothers in Paris. It was he who built a strong organization among the Italians in Tunisia and Fascist groups throughout Latin America. It was he who started the Spanish civil war; and even if he showed some hesitation about Hitler's annexation of Austria, it was clear by then that his destiny was indissolubly bound with Hitler's.

His attack on Abyssinia was part of a whole imperialist program in the Mediterranean area; his attack on France was projected before Germany started its invasion. Italian neutrality and Italian belligerency have from the start been planned from the point of view of the Axis; and what role should be adopted has been carefully calculated according to the immediate situation. Too few people read the books by Sforza, Salvemini, Borgese, or Ascoli, or the articles by Ferrero, a Prato, or Don Sturzo. Too many people saw the danger of fascism only when Italy entered the war on the side of Germany.

Italy should have taught the democracies a lesson, if a negative one. In no case was the futility of attempting to appease the Axis more eloquently proved. From the outbreak of hostilities in Europe to Italy's entrance into the war, every imaginable and even unimaginable effort was made to keep Italy neutral. Naval measures intended to stiffen the British blockade were reversed or softened just to please Rome. The slightest criticism of Italian foreign policy by a Pertinax or Kerillis was expurgated by the French press. London and Paris were ready to do anything to appease Mussolini and to help him protect fascism from the impact of the war, as they had helped uphold it in the pre-war years.

Il Duce arbitrarily fixed the birth date of Italian fascism, which came into being unheralded by the people of whom it claims to be the expression. Now it has died—died almost unbeknownst to those who today give the order for the celebration of its twentieth anniversary. It has been strangled by its younger and more terrible brother, German fascism, coming down from the north and assuming the monopoly of violence and tyranny. Hitler and his Gestapo are rulers in Rome.

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The Sword, Not the Umbrella

"Public opinion knows that the capital crime of French policy during the interval between the two wars was that the representatives of the people placed blind trust in the technicians of the General Staff, who created an anachronistic army from the dual point of view of material and methods of combat.

"Public opinion knows that every technical question must be plumbed to the bottom, and by technicians. But it is disturbed by the thought that the supreme decisions of global war might be taken by the technicians alone. The place and the hour of the opening of the second front must be decided, after all the technical studies have been made, by the political leaders of the United Nations.

"The second front is not a question of strategy and tactics alone, but one of spiritual direction. It is, then, a question of politics in the highest and noblest sense of the word, of politics accumulating with cold lucidity the information of the technicians and taking its own tragic decisions with full responsibility.

"Public opinion calls upon the leaders of the coalition to carry in their hands the sword of Foch, not the umbrella of Chamberlain."

[From a letter by Emile Vaillancourt, distinguished French Canadian writer and lecturer, to Premier Mackenzie King, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt]

The Radio Squadron

BY ALIX REUTHER

NOW that an Allied offensive is imminent, it is imperative that we work out a plan whereby our potential allies—the peoples of the occupied countries—may be utilized to supplement the action of our military forces. The first question this raises is: how can we inform the peoples of Europe of our plan and of their part in carrying it out?

At present our only means of direct communication is the short-wave radio. But the numbers that can be reached in this way are extremely limited. Throughout the occupied countries short-wave sets have been confiscated wherever they could be found, and the death penalty has been decreed for listening. However, though short-wave sets have been largely wiped out, nearly everyone in Europe owns a simple little radio on which he is compelled to listen to what his masters tell him. Only three or four fascist-controlled stations can be tuned in on these sets, but if we broadcast on the same wave lengths we can be heard. How can we do this? The answer is the "radio squadron."

The radio squadron will be attached to the spearheads of the invading United Nations armies. It will consist of skilled radio technicans with superb equipment. These will become what is called, in radio language, "pirates." They will set up their long-wave transmitters to broadcast on somebody else's wave length. The Russian ghost voice has shown the world how effectively this can be done. The equipment will have to be extremely compact so that it can be moved forward behind the front battle lines and be made ready for operation just as fast as are the field kitchens and the supply columns. It will have to be adaptable for use in the Flying Fortresses or patrol planes which accompany the armies.

Just as important as the technical equipment and the skilled engineers will be the "ground crews" of these radio squadrons. They will be experts in psychological warfare, and they should be natives of the country we are moving into. They must know the "terrain."

All over the free world there are thousands of anti-fascist refugees, many of them former newspapermen. In this country a large number of them are already aiding in the United Nations' psychological war effort by broadcasting daily, over government short wave, messages of hope and anti-fascist propaganda to their oppressed compatriots in Europe. These men and women, most of whom have become experts in psychological warfare, will form the nucleus of the radio squadron's ground crews. Theirs will be the job of speaking to their own people—of telling them what we expect them to do.

The radio squadrons will have to coordinate their activity with that of the armed forces and at all times subordinate themselves to the High Command, which will have a section devoted entirely to psychological warfare. The general staff directing this new branch of our armies will draw up plans like any military general staff. It will always keep in mind that this new kind of warfare cannot be directed from a swivel-chair in Washington or London; that after the broad outline of the strategy has been decided upon, the officers of the radio squadrons must determine, on the spot, where and when the next "ether raid" is to take place.

An important part of the job of these radio squadrons will be to tell the enslaved peoples of our ideas for the peace, to reassure them, and to hammer it into their minds that our invasion will not just bring a change of masters but will help them regain their national and personal liberties. This part of the squadron's attack will be in many ways the most difficult, because it will have to overcome years of fascist lies. Another task will be to inform the people of our progress, to give them "hot" news reports. The monitor unit attached to the squadron will pick up the enemy's hoax and combat it at once.

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To illustrate, let us assume that we have established three bridgeheads on the English Channel. The fascist radio is already in action telling the people of France that the Nazi army has just achieved another "victory" and repulsed the United Nations' attempt to invade the Continent. The French people, tuning in their radios, hear the Goebbels lie that we have been driven back into the sea. In reality we have established bridgeheads and have already set up not only a service of supply but our radio squadrons. The monitors, hearing the fascist radio, are greatly amused to hear that they have been drowned. The ground crew takes over, and the counter-attack starts on the same wave length on which Goebbels has just drowned the invaders. As the counter-attack swings into action, the people, say, of Rennes hear that we are only about forty miles from their city. They realize that they have given way to despair too soon and that they can go ahead and blow up that certain bridge and dynamite that nearby railroad junction, and that within a few hours they will be able to join the armies of the United Nations.

The hypothetical incident just outlined shows that it will be impossible to direct this new kind of warfare from any other point than from the fighting front itself. Washington and London might not get the complete report on the successful establishment of the bridgeheads for twelve or twenty-four hours. By then the entire situation might have changed.

The commando raid at Dieppe proved the great need for radio squadrons. The moment Allied troops landed, the British Broadcasting Corporation started broadcasting urgent messages to the French people warning them not to let themselves be provoked into any action whatever and to stay home. Most important of all, it kept repeating that the action in progress was only a commando raid and *not* the expected invasion. The British did not know whether the French heard the warning broadcasts, but they probably did not, for it was later reported that the Germans had shot eleven Dieppe civilians and imprisoned several hundred. Had these heard the British warning to lie low and take no action, they would not have become involved.

On the day after the raid Fernand de Brinon, so-called Vichy ambassador to Paris, announced that all "illegal" radios throughout France were to be confiscated immediately. What could have been the reason for that statement at that particular time? Everyone, both inside and outside France, knew very well that it was not a new order, that confiscation and reprisal had been going on for more than two years, and that there were supposedly no more "illegal" radios in existence.

It is clear that the only reason the Nazis and their Vichy associates could have had for issuing this obviously phony order was to fool us, and especially the B. B. C. They wanted us to believe that we could actually reach the people by short- and medium-wave radio. The Nazis

Out of Sorrow, Joy; out of Death, Victory



Drawing by Hoffmeister.

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hope that once we really believe this, our General Staff will rely upon it in establishing invasion strategy. In reality, of course, any action based on such a false premise would be doomed to failure.

During the Dieppe raid and for weeks afterward the Berlin radio screamed to the world at large and to France in particular that *l'affaire Dieppe* was the greatest defeat yet suffered by the Allies inasmuch as it had been planned as a bridgehead for the second front; that this utter rout proved that the second front would never come to pass, that the Nazi fortifications were impregnable. The effect of these broadcasts on the morale of the French people cannot be exaggerated. If the commandos at Dieppe had included a radio squadron broadcasting on either the Dieppe or the Paris frequency, our warnings would have been heeded and the limited scope of the operation been made clear.

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

IF THE scene of a contemporary Offenbach operetta were laid in a government office called "Leadership of German Poetry" (*Deutsche Dichtungsführung*), one would take it for rather sardonic raillery. But the thing actually exists. Goebbels, the commander-in-chief of the commandos of poetry, referred to his department as the "Poetry Leadership" several times in a long speech he delivered on October 11 before a German poets' meeting in Weimar, the city of Goethe.

There the assembled gentlemen of the pen heard once more what the chief demanded of them and what he censured in them. It developed that he was rather dissatisfied. And why? His reasons remind us of a phenomenon which has great significance for this column.

The trouble starts from the fact that the Herren Authors persistently fail to choose for their books the material which they should choose. Of course they cannot write what is forbidden; but most of them do not write what is wanted. They deny their "link with the present." They have no feeling for the times. To put it more plainly: they choose material which is not connected with the war, the Führer, or National Socialism.

And that is not all. Not only do authors refuse to use 100 per cent Nazi subject matter; they are apathetic toward other themes which the regime would like to have written about. For example, "a large group of subjects stemming out of such present-day German realities as the state or the worker receive only perfunctory treatment." Further, not enough industry is displayed in writing the popular books which the regime demands. "Many of you seem to have the idea that it is beneath your dignity, and not your mission, to write light, exciting books. I should like to say that in the National Socialist state every cultural task acquires worth if it finds favor with the people."

Writers form only one group in the great class of the intelligentsia, and it is even more interesting to observe that Goebbels attacked the apathy and stubbornness of the whole class. Using that defensive tone which of late dominates his speeches, he insisted that the Nazi regime is in principle not hostile to intelligence. "I consider this an opportunity to put a stop to a widespread error which threatens to alarm unnecessarily a certain part of our intelligentsia and to prevent them from giving their unconditional cooperation. It is the practice of National Socialism to keep a certain type of intellectualism under sharp observation, to subject it to biting public criticism. As a result, some honorable and entirely well-intentioned persons have felt themselves attacked when they were not meant at all."

But although Herr Goebbels swore he had nothing against intellectuals as such, he flayed a whole stratum of them as indifferent, skeptical, decadent. And he asserted further that these formed the great majority of moderate intellectuals. The average member of the intelligentsia, in his presentation, is the enemy. "It would be a national misfortune for our people," he said, "if this type of person, with his persistent doubts, were able to poison public opinion. . . . No worse perversity of the human spirit can be imagined. He must be unmasked and exposed to public contempt."

The long and the short of it is that a considerable part of the German intelligentsia forms a disturbing element for the Nazis. They refuse to write the right books, they cooperate only with "reservations"; their "persistent doubts" have a poisonous effect. Anyone acquainted with conditions has known this for a long time. It is clear that the intelligentsia provides the best leverage for lifting the Reich off its hinges.

Where Did They Go?

THE news that an Italian Alpine regiment had mutinied at Gorizia in northern Italy when it was ordered to the Russian front was hailed all over the world as a sign of Italian internal disintegration. But since the news was sent from London by Reuters, the Italian Propaganda Ministry found it easy to deny. More difficult to deny will be their own figures. The Italian High Command's report of casualties for the month of September officially announces total casualties as 13,936. Of these, 1,873 were killed, 5,431 wounded, and 5,632 missing. Further the communiqué specifies that the greatest casualties were on the Russian front; it gives them as 1,054 killed and 4,121 wounded, failing here to mention the missing. Why were they not numbered? Where did they go? The Reuters dispatch gives us a hint. On the Russian front "missing" might well mean "mutinied," and troops that refuse to fight or go over to the enemy are not included in the casualty figures.

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Faced with this opposition the British government put an end to intervention.

There are many things to note about this first proof of solidarity between the British and Russian workers. First, no sympathy was shown with the tactics of the Russian government; yet the British labor movement explicitly recognized that the Soviet Union was a workers' state. A detailed account of the proceedings would show that the conventional leftist summary does not describe it properly. It is true that action was first demanded on the Clydebank and in South Wales, the two strongholds of revolutionary leftism in Britain. It is undeniable, also, that this early demand was resisted by the right-wing Executive. Nevertheless, to say that the left won the masses over to a vigorous policy of class struggle that was, in the last analysis, consistent only with a Communist philosophy would be to blunder very badly. For a considerable time before the August, 1920, showdown the vigor and enthusiasm of what is normally called the right wing had matched that of the left. The general strike was demanded by men who, ready enough to "revolt" if that became necessary, would never have instituted a regime of the Russian kind.

Second, long before August, 1920, the shrewdest labor leaders, whether they belonged to right, left, or center, understood that the British government's war on the Soviets was aimed at the whole Socialist and trade-union movement. The demand for action, however, only became unanimous when the question was unmistakably proved to be one of actual war or peace.

A last observation, on a fundamental point: one must note that sense of autonomy or "prerogative" which underlay the British labor movement's thought during this crisis. The reactionary press never made a greater blunder than to accuse trade unionists of threatening to strike on Russian orders. The British movement felt itself to be a brother of the Russian, but not a child or a pupil. It has never felt that, and it never will. And just as the political and industrial arms alike regard themselves as *the* British movement, so, through thick and thin, has British labor regarded the Russian government as the instrument of the Russian movement. I want to make this perfectly clear. I was for many years the only left-wing official of one of the largest branches of the British National Union of Railwaymen. Throughout the innumerable political debates in that branch meeting-hall, in which I was invariably in a minority of two or three, I do not remember hearing anyone raise doubts as to whether the U. S. S. R. was an authentic workers' state. As time went on, certain developments in Russia displeased more and more Englishmen, but they never destroyed the profound if sometimes vague sense of legitimacy which has attached itself to the Soviet Union from the beginning to the present day.

III

The British labor movement's consciousness of its prerogative is of great importance. It owes its existence to the tremendously significant fact that there is only one British working-class party of any size. Within the Labor Party the widest differences of opinion constantly give rise to debate, but the sharpest controversy has never been permitted to split the party. And when, as over the Popular Front issue, local breakaways have occurred, the splinters have returned to the national party before very long. Similarly, there has never been more than one great trade-union federation, the Trades Union Congress, within which the industrial and craft unions affiliated to the Labor Party exist side by side.

Though British Labor's attitude toward the Soviet Union remained at bottom the same, in later years the warmth and naturalness went out of it. The tactics of the Communist Party of Great Britain had much to do with this estrangement, certainly more than the rightward drift of the labor movement after the general strike in 1926. In its very first request for affiliation, dated August 10, 1920—during Labor's stirring defense of the U. S. S. R.—The Communist Party demanded to know whether "the Labor Party Executive decisively and categorically rejects the dictatorship of the proletariat." It is in the light of this question that the average British Labor Party member has always viewed the problem from that day to this. For that reason he has always rejected Communist affiliation.

On the other hand, the Communists have since vehemently asserted that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was not in debate, that their intention was only to work within the party for a vigorous working-class program of action, a program which they were often able to devise and which was usually lacking in the major party. Whatever may have been the truth, a resolution proposing their inclusion was voted down for the first time in 1921, and for the last in 1942. It has so frequently been asserted that this rejection was the work of a reactionary trade-union leadership that it is worth while to recall one extraordinarily significant fact. It is that in the very years when the Labor Party was devising the most stringent rulings against the Communists, the British T. U. C., under its official leaders, was making persistent efforts not only to establish good relations with the Russian unions but to gain entry for the Russians into the International Federation of Trade Unions. Yet, broadly speaking, the British unions and the Labor Party were dominated by the same people. It was the October, 1924, convention of the Labor Party which most clearly defined and decided the Communist question. But in that year the Hull T. U. C., after giving a warm welcome to the Soviets' fraternal delegate, authorized a British delegation, headed by its highest officials, to attend the Sixth All-Russian Trade

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Union Congress in Moscow. On November 17, 1924, in Moscow, the Russian presidium and the president and secretary of the British General Council signed a joint declaration pledging both movements to work for international unity. Next year saw these phenomena repeated. The Liverpool convention of the party took fresh and more stringent action against the Communists, while the Scarborough T. U. C. unanimously agreed to persevere in seeking Russian admission to the I. F. T. U. in the face of bitter Continental opposition. All this was long before the general strike had deflected the movement to the right.

After the general strike the controversy was constantly refought in a mood of ever-increasing bitterness. I do not think that anyone who had intimate contact with the British movement at that time can possibly doubt that it was this infuriating, never-settled debate which gradually reduced the average party member's sympathy with the Soviet Union. Rightly or wrongly he felt that the government of the U. S. S. R. approved the Communist Party's tactics.

How disastrous this tendency was can now be seen. When, after the rise of Hitler, the Comintern reversed its immediate policy and strove to create those united or popular fronts which were the corollary of the Soviets' effort to further collective security, the British Labor Party would have no part of it. Somewhat tardily the party recognized the need for an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, but it did not understand that only a united front with all other working-class and popular organizations, as well as with the Liberal Party, could drive Chamberlain toward such a course. The fault lay by no means exclusively with the Communists, although their past tactics would probably have been sufficient to earn rejection for the proposal. By the time popular pressure had compelled Chamberlain to abandon appeasement, the U. S. S. R. had gone another way.

IV

Yet even through the darks days of Soviet appeasement there was no fundamental change of attitude toward the U. S. S. R. The organized British workers rejected the suicidal advice of the Comintern, but were on guard against any attempt to "switch the war" against the Soviets. While the danger of such a switch has been absurdly exaggerated, during the Russo-Finnish war Sir Walter Citrine, president of the I. F. T. U. and an old opponent of the Communists, thought it wise to warn the Chamberlain government that the movement would resist any attempt to make war on the U. S. S. R. It was not merely that the Labor Party rejected the philosophy of such men as Wilfred Wellock, who within the socialist movement argued that Bolshevism and Nazism were two routes for arriving at the same goal. There was still a belief that the Soviet government, despite all changes, was a workers' and a socialist government. Above all, the party realized that Nazism was the only real external enemy of labor's cause.

Then, with Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the socialist sympathy dormant within the labor movement rapidly awakened. It has been said that the popularity of the U. S. S. R. in Britain is due simply to a beleaguered and frustrated people's admiration for a great fighter. The great measure of truth in this is still short of being the whole truth. This fraternity in combat has, indeed, given strength to a second-front movement which is able to challenge and defeat governmental candidates in local elections, though it gets its backing neither from the Labor Party nor from the Communists. I refer to the "Second Front Now" campaign sponsored by Lord Beaverbrook in his *Daily Express*—as odd a phenomenon as if the New York *Daily News* were suddenly to break into a headlong pro-Soviet rampage. The Communist Party has put on considerable weight and is waging a campaign for increased production, which is undoubtedly of great service. But very few Britons have taken Soviet military toughness as proof of the soundness of the Communist political line.

On the question of Communist affiliation this year's Labor Party convention had nothing new to say. By a majority of thirteen thousand votes in two million, the party registered a civil-liberties decision by calling for an end to the ban on the *Daily Worker,* but against the old affiliation plea a majority of two million was piled up. However, people who would make this a test of sympathy with the Soviets completely mistake the point. Labor's recognition of Soviet successes has never taken the form of rallying behind the British Communists. Enthusiasm for some achievement of the Soviets, on the contrary, almost invariably encourages a British Labor man in his support of his own party. Every burst of enthusiasm for the Soviets also tends to move the Labor Party itself toward the left, its own left. This year's Labor Party conference was no exception. The observed leftward swing was doubtless due in great measure to Mr. Churchill's reluctance to talk about real reform. The sequence of military defeats had something to do with it also. But speeches from the platform as well as from the floor suggested that admiration for the Soviets' resistance was another incentive. Moreover, while the Soviets are immensely popular far outside the workers' movement, only the Labor Party as yet has expressed itself politically. Within the party and within the trade unions the new enthusiasm has had definite political results. The rapid war-time growth of the British unions and the rising temper of the political wing make it important briefly to review these developments.

V

When Hitler marched into Russia, the Labor Party at once greeted the Soviet Union. The T. U. C. Executive itself was not far behind in reviving the old Anglo-

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Soviet Trade Union Committee, the first war-time session of which was held in Moscow on October 13, 14, and 15, 1941. The British delegation, headed by the anti-Communist Citrine, included no member so far to the left as Tanner, the president of the Amalgamated Engineers and the most effective pro-Soviet non-Communist. More important than the eight-point agreement reached was the British invitation, in which Mr. Churchill had cordially concurred, to the Russian unions to send a delegation to England. None of the articles of the October agreement, unfortunately, expressly refer to the post-war period. The most interesting of them is the seventh, which pledges the two trade-union groups to the task of organizing mutual assistance. This is a text that may cover very much or very little solid ground. Exactly what it does mean will be decided by European developments in general. Attempts have been made to minimize the importance of the Soviet delegation's visit to England. Every account reaching me is emphatic that the Russian unionists' tour was a real source of encouragement to the British worker. Both the government and the T. U. C. had hoped that the visit would give a strong fillip to production. And there is no doubt that it did.

The Soviet delegates made no explicit political comments except to repeat strictures on management which the British unions had themselves already made time and time again. In one case, however, Shvernick, the leader of the Russian delegation, seems to have attempted to check unreasonable criticism of a management. In another case he said that the induction of women into industry was proceeding at too slow a pace, despite governmental orders, adding that it was more important to carry out these orders than to obtain an increased workers' share in management. The instructed observer will see in this a criticism of international and local trade-union leadership. At Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham, and other industrial cities the Russians addressed important trade-union conferences and in some places took part in business meetings of the shop stewards. The T. U. C. significantly took advantage of the furor—that is the only word to describe the British response to the visit of the Russian delegation—to open a new drive for increased worker participation in management.

VI

Harry Pollitt, the real leader of the British Communist Party, writing in the January number of the Communist *Labor Monthly,* argued somewhat revealingly that the 1941 Anglo-Soviet treaty had made possible a new labor unity. At the June convention of the Labor Party the floor gave a tremendous ovation to the platform when it was announced that the party leadership intended to ask the Soviet government to receive a Labor Party delegation with a view to establishing full and permanent relations between the Russian and British political movements. This, incidentally, was very much more than a British move, for at the present time many past presidents and executives of the Second International are living in London. These men, as well as former trade-union officials of the United Nations, were consulted before the approach to Moscow was made, and their warm approval was given to it.

There is no reason for naivete. The kind of unity Harry Pollitt had in mind, the immediate affiliation of the British Communist Party to the Labor Party, was not intended to be furthered by this approach to Moscow. It was the larger view of Europe as a whole which moved the Labor leadership, and this was understood by the convention floor. The Labor Party was unmistakably expressing its belief that the two Internationals must draw together, for it was clearly not the Soviet government as such but the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, behind that party, the Comintern which the Labor Party wished to meet. In thus going to what it believed to be the source of all authority in the Comintern, the Labor Party at least brought into contact the only two remaining working-class parties of any size in Europe.

It is probable, however, that a shrewd mental calculation had been made, not dissimilar to the one that seems implicit in Harry Pollitt's argument. If the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1941, which did not promise a long-enduring post-war collaboration between the two powers, could have that effect, then the treaty of 1942, with its vision of twenty years' partnership, ought to have a greater result. The Labor Party knows that the policy of the C. P. G. B. is largely determined by the Soviets' international position. It is more than probable, therefore, that Labor thought that the Russian leaders might soon be inclined to recognize the British Labor Party as *the* British movement. The British party cannot fail to have noticed that the Comintern has not followed a strictly revolutionary policy for many years now. It is not easy to avoid polemics at this point, but it would seem that while the Communists have always kept revolutionary intentions at the back of their heads, the Comintern's direction has been increasingly concerned with Soviet defense rather than with preparing for eventual insurrection. British Labor perhaps thought that the Soviet party might be willing to make contacts with the massive and disciplined British movement upon the basis of recognition of prerogatives. Did the Labor Party also calculate that in accepting this much more effective defense against whatever opposition might arise in the post-war world, the Soviet party might advise the British and the European Communist parties to follow what could be called a Popular Front line? If this should come about, what consequences might it have?

This must be noted. The immediate policy of the

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British Communists today is perfectly assimilable by any organization as broad as the British Labor Party. To be exact, the C. P. G. B., if admitted to the Labor Party, would now constitute its right rather than its left wing. In the post-war world it will almost certainly move to the left again; but as long as the U. S. S. R. enjoyed good external relations, an affiliated Communist Party would not openly violate the constitution of the movement or go contrary to its spirit.

Would a long-term association of the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom so mold the two parties that they might work together in this way? And if so, what would be the effect on the European labor movement? These are questions I prefer to raise rather than to answer. *Both* parties must be molded. From a narrow right-wing standpoint one might ask, Why should the Labor Party make concessions? Many answers could be given, but they are all accessory to one powerful argument. To move leftward is not a concession but a sheer necessity if the party is to be reinvigorated. To be in earnest about socialism is not a concession. The old hesitancy will insure defeats in the post-war world similar in kind and ultimately as grave in consequence as those of the pre-war epoch. To effect such a reinvigoration it may be necessary to reduce the power of the trade-union delegates to the party convention. Yet if the party sets out to win the British masses, even that may be unnecessary. Moreover, it is now reasonably certain that the cessation of war will see an immediate upsurge of desire for reform. Not even the diehards of the Labor right wing can wholly resist that tide. In any case, one notes with a certain grim relief, the Old Guard will be dying off very shortly.

For my part, I believe that if the Communist Party persists in demanding affiliation in an atmosphere such as may be created in the next few years, it will probably gain it. And provided this demand leads to a constitutional debate about a legitimate leftism, the gain will be enormous.

With the problem solved in Britain and with consequent security for the U. S. S. R., the sad disasters of the European movements might be undone. The development would not run counter to the history of revolutions. The French Revolution itself, opposed by Britain, nevertheless had great and good consequences for English political life. I confess, with Alvarez del Vayo, a total disbelief in the "wisdom" of the old diplomacy. The problems he raised in *The Nation* can only be solved by the people themselves, by their relentless pressure for a new social order. The people, however, cannot do this without parties. The parties exist; they need invigoration. But without unity they will not, over the whole field of Europe, find new life. A unified labor movement, on its political as well as its industrial side, is an absolute essential.

Everybody's Business

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

A Tax Victory for Business

THE least-publicized feature of the 1942 tax law, signed by the President on October 21, is the comparative lightness of the new burden which it imposes on corporation profits. In his recommendations to Congress on March 3 Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau asked for total tax increases of $7.6 billion, of which $3.2 billion would be derived from additional levies on corporations. The tax bill in its completed form achieved the goal originally set by the Treasury, but the contribution of business had been whittled down to about half.

This result must be considered a striking victory for the corporations, since the tax law actually comes close to fulfilling their fondest hopes. Last March, at the hearings of the House Ways and Means Committee, a representative of the National Association of Manufacturers put forward proposals which would have meant an increase in corporation income and excess-profits taxes of about $1.4 billion. This has proved a shot remarkably near the bull's-eye, for it is estimated that the increase in these levies provided by the new law will produce about $1.5 billion. As the *Wall Street Journal* says with engaging candor, "More concern for business was shown in this bill than in any other recent tax measure. . . . The new rates are high, but they are not nearly as high as the levels which were considered and discarded."

The following table illustrates this statement and shows how at each stage of the tax bill's progress through Congress the corporate load was lightened:

	1941 law	*Treasury proposals*	*House version*	*Bill as enacted*
Combined normal and surtax on corporations with incomes over $25,000	31	55	45	40
Excess-profits tax	35-60	50-75	90	90*
Additional revenue from corporate taxes		$3.2	$2.64	$1.5

(*Percentage*) (*Billions*)

* With a 10 per cent post-war credit and a tax ceiling of 80 per cent of total earnings.

This table, however, does not by itself tell the whole story or explain the 100 per cent difference in yield between the Treasury proposals and the rates approved by Congress. The secret lies in a mass of relief provisions which have something for almost every corporate somebody. Utility companies, for instance, benefit by a surtax deduction for dividends paid on preferred stocks which it is estimated will be worth $18,000,000 annually to them. All corporations stand to gain from permission to buy up their own bonds at less than par without incurring a tax liability. This relief is especially signifi-

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cant for the railroads, which will be encouraged to use their bonanza war profits to cut down their mountainous indebtedness.

Another section of the law is designed to foster the mining of strategic metals by exempting from excess-profits taxes all earnings derived from the production of antimony, manganese, tin, and other scarce minerals. Lumber mills and coal and iron mines are also to receive a rebate on earnings resulting from an increase in output over the 1936-39 average. Provisions of this nature are perhaps justified as war-time incentives, but the same argument can hardly be used in favor of maintaining depletion allowances for oil and other extractive industries at rates which have no relation to actually realized depletion. As Senator Robert La Follette, who strenuously but unsuccessfully supported the Treasury's recommendation of a revision in these allowances, revealed in the *Progressive* of October 12, "Tax returns filed by 78 oil companies for the year 1941 show total deductions of percentage depletion amounting to $30,600,000, while on their own books they acknowledged the actual depletion suffered aggregated only $6,100,000." The continued embodiment in the tax structure of special privileges of this nature is a tribute to the strength of the big-business lobbies but hardly to that of Congressional character.

In setting the excess-profits rate as high as 90 per cent, Congress appears to have outdone the Treasury in severity. But many corporations, especially those with an inflated capital structure, like the big steel companies, were delighted to exchange a punishing excess-profits rate for lower normal taxes and surtaxes. Moreover, the new law provides numerous offsets. The limitation of any company's combined income and excess-profits tax to 80 per cent of net earnings will enable some of the war babies—operating largely on capital provided directly or indirectly by the government—to make for their shareholders a very handsome return indeed on money actually invested. Those businesses, on the other hand, which have been hit by the curtailment of civilian production have been taken care of by provisions enabling them (a) to carry back losses incurred this year against 1941 taxable income; (b) to apply any excess-tax credit unused this year against last year's excess-profits payments. These relief provisions will result in some sizable refunds.

As a result of all this generosity, a good many corporate earnings statements for 1942 are going to show a much rosier state of affairs for stockholders than reports for the first three-quarters would indicate. Most companies, partly as a matter of prudent accounting, partly with the idea that a display of poverty was good policy while Congress was mulling over the tax bill, reported quarterly profits after making reserves for taxes based on the Treasury proposals. Now they will be able to write back substantial amounts out of these reserves, which thanks to Congress have proved unnecessarily high. Under the circumstances the recent bullishness of stocks hardly requires explanation.

In the Wind

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE was recently informed that one of her close associates in the Republican Party in Connecticut had once been decorated by Mussolini. "I know nothing," she wrote, "about Mr. Pallotti's receiving a decoration from Mussolini, nor what the time or the occasion may have been. There was a time, of course, when we all thought that Mussolini was doing a good job. That was before he became a partner in the Axis."

FROM AN ARTICLE on government press agents in the *New Republic:* "Pearl Harbor caught the United States with no clear-cut information policy. George Creel maintains that he did the job quicker, better, and cheaper."

THE DECLINE of the millionaires was the subject of a recent article in the New York *World-Telegram:* "Mr. and Mrs. Harrison Williams," the paragraph ran, "have closed four of their five homes, put their eight cars in storage, reduced the number of their household servants from twenty-five to ten, and shut off all except two floors of the thirty-room pink colonial brick mansion at 1130 Fifth Avenue where they now live. Millionaires are on the skids."

THE HOBO WAR LEAGUE, recently founded by the *Hobo News,* is starting an intensive campaign to encourage its members to fill the places of drafted farm workers. "Turn 'the bum factory' into a producing factory," is one of the league's slogans. Another is, "For Victory let us buy bonds to buy bombs to bomb the Axis bums."

THE MURDER of a war worker who had recently been involved in a felonious-assault case and because of that had lost his job was reported in the New York *World-Telegram* of October 19. The man's nickname, according to the story, was Red. But the headline said: "Aircraft Plant Fired Astoria Welder, Known as a Red."

A RECENT ISSUE of the *Wall Street Journal* reported the lengths to which employers of domestic help have gone in trying to keep their servants: "A United States employment office in Connecticut, for instance, has felt their pressure. Women protested directly to the office against factory placements, worked indirectly through their husbands. In Mississippi the government thinks it may lose a teapot battle against a group of women who don't want their help leaving for a war plant. The battle there reportedly proceeds more openly, with the well-to-do white women telling the working white women that they will get no jobs in the war factory if the colored women do."

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

POE AS A LITERARY CRITIC

BY EDMUND WILSON

POE, at the time of his death in 1849, had had the intention of publishing a book on "The Authors of America in Prose and Verse." He had already worked over to a considerable extent the material of his articles and reviews; and the collection of critical writing printed by Griswold after his death is something between a journalistic chronicle like Bernard Shaw's dramatic notices and a selected and concentrated volume like Eliot's "The Sacred Grove."

Poe as a critic has points of resemblance both with Eliot and with Shaw. He deals vigorously and boldly with books as they come into his hands day by day, as Shaw did with the plays of the season, and manages to be brilliant and arresting even about works of no interest; he constantly insists, as Eliot does, on attempting, in the practice of this journalism, to formulate general principles. His literary articles and lectures, in fact, surely constitute the most remarkable body of criticism ever produced in the United States.

Henry James called it "probably the most complete and exquisite specimen of *provincialism* ever prepared for the edification of men." But though Poe had his share of provincialism, as all American writers did in that period, the thing that most strikes us today is his success in holding himself above it. Intellectually he stands on higher ground than any other American writer of his time. He is trying to curb the tendency of the Americans to overrate or overpraise their own books, and at the same time he is fighting a rear-guard action against the over-inflation of British reputations and the British injustice to American writers; and he has also a third battle: to break down the monopolistic instincts of the New Englanders, who tended to act as a clique and to keep out New Yorkers and Southerners. On one plane Poe grapples realistically with the practical problems of writers in the United States of that time—the copyright situation and the growth of the American magazines, with their influence on literary technique; and on another plane he is able to take in the large developments of Western literature.

With his general interest in method, he has definite ideas about the procedures in a variety of departments of literature—fiction, poetry, satire, travel, criticism. And he can be elevated, ironic, analytical, as the subject in hand requires. His prose is as taut as in his stories, but it has cast off the imagery of his fiction to become simply sharp and precise—our only first-rate classical prose of this period. His mind is a livid but incandescent shaft that is leveled at the successive objects in the American literary landscape like the searchlight on the Albany night boat that picks out the houses along the Hudson; and as there we are induced to stare at even undistinguished places which have been plucked out of the darkness into a spectral intensity of relief, so here we must read even the essays on insignificant figures whose dead features the critic makes radiant even while he is speeding them to oblivion. When we have put the whole picture together, we see it as clearly—to change the figure—as the geography of a landscape on the moon under an unattainably powerful telescope. There is no other such picture in our literature.

But Poe had tweaked the beard of Longfellow and had made people laugh at a Channing, and the lurking rancor of New England seems to have worked against the acceptance of his criticism. There is an anecdote in W. D. Howells's book, "Literary Friends and Acquaintance," which shows both the attitude of New England and the influence of this attitude on others. Howells had visited Boston for the first time when he was twenty-three, and he had gone to see Emerson in Concord. Poe had been dead ten years.

> After dinner [says Howells] we walked about in [Emerson's] "pleached garden" a little, and then we came again into his library, where I meant to linger only till I could fitly get away. He questioned me about what I had seen of Concord, and whom besides Hawthorne I had met, and when I told him only Thoreau, he asked me if I knew the poems of Mr. William Ellery Channing. I have known them since, and felt their quality, which I have gladly owned a genuine and original poetry; but I answered then truly that I knew them only from Poe's criticisms: cruel and spiteful things which I should be ashamed of enjoying as I once did. "Whose criticisms?" asked Emerson. "Poe's," I said again. "Oh," he cried out, after a moment, as if he had returned from a far search for my meaning, *"you mean the jingle-man."** I do not know why this should have put me to such confusion, but if I had written the criticisms myself I do not think I could have been more abashed. Perhaps I felt an edge of reproof, of admonition, in a characterization of Poe which the world will hardly agree with; though I do not agree with the world about him, myself, in its admiration. At any rate, it made an end of me for the time, and I remained as if already absent, while Emerson questioned me as to what I had written in the *Atlantic Monthly*.

That Emerson's opinion of Channing was not so very different from Poe's is shown by an entry in his journal for 1855:

> Ellery Channing's poetry has the merit of being genuine, and not the metrical commonplaces of the magazines, but

* It is true that Poe had not much admired Emerson and had been rather insulting about him in A Chapter on Autography.

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> it is painfully incomplete. He has not kept faith with the reader; 'tis shamefully insolent and slovenly. He should have lain awake all night to find the true rhyme for a verse, and he has availed himself of the first one that came; so that it is all a babyish incompleteness.

The prejudice of New England against Poe was supported by the bad reputation that had been given him by Griswold's mendacious memoir. It was not so long ago that it was possible for President Hadley of Yale to explain the refusal of the Hall of Fame to admit Poe among its immortals on the ground that he "wrote like a drunkard and a man who is not accustomed to pay his debts"; and it was only last year that Professor A. H. Quinn showed the lengths to which Griswold had gone by producing the originals of Poe's letters and printing them side by side with Griswold's falsifications.

We have often been told of Poe's criticism that it is spiteful, that it is pretentious, that it is vitiated by Poe's acceptance of the sentimental bad taste of his time. In regard to the first two of these charges it must be admitted that these essays give us unpleasant moments; they do have their queer knots and wrinkles; they are neurotic as all Poe's work is neurotic; and the distortions do here sometimes throw us off as they do not do in the stories, because it is here a question of judgment, whereas in his fiction the distortion itself is the subject of the story. It is true, as Joseph Wood Krutch has said, that there is constantly felt in Poe's criticism the same element of obsessive cruelty that inspires his tales of horror. Yet in his criticism Poe does try to hold this in check—with an occasional effect of inconsistency, in judgment as well as in tone, as when he will begin by telling us that certain passages in some book he is reviewing are among the best things of their kind to be found in contemporary writing, and then go on to pick the poet to pieces slowly, coldly, and at a length of many pages. It is also true that Poe pretends sometimes, or at least sometimes lets us infer, that he has read things he has not read. The psychology of the pretender is always a factor to be reckoned with in Poe.

The child of a fascinating actress who had died when he was two years old, he had been adopted by a Scotch merchant in Richmond, brought up as a Southern gentleman, and then cast off with no job and no money at the end of his first year of college, during which his adoptive father had failed to pay even his necessary expenses, so that he could associate, as he said, "with no students except those who were in a similar situation with myself." Poe had always been in the false situation of not being Allan's son and of knowing that in the society he was bred to his parents had been déclassés; and now he was suddenly deprived of his role of a well-heeled young Southern gentleman with prospects of inheriting a fortune, and found himself a poor man with no backing who had to survive in the American Grub Street. He had the confidence of faith in superior abilities, and the reports of his work at his English school and at the University of Virginia show that he excelled as a student. But his studies had been aborted at the same time as his social career, and a shade of the uncertainty of the "gentleman" was communicated also to the "scholar." Perhaps, also, though Poe's mind was a first-rate one, there was in him a dash of the actor who delights in elaborating a part.

Out of this consciousness of being a pretender, at any rate, with its infliction of a habitual secretiveness, came certainly Poe's love of cryptograms, his interest in inventing and solving crimes, and his indulgence in concocting and exposing hoaxes. If Poe sometimes plays unavowed tricks by cheating the reader a little about what he has written or read, the imposture is still almost as gratuitous, as innocent, and as unimportant as Stendhal's disguises and aliases and his weakness for taking ladies from the provinces through Paris and misinforming them about the public monuments. And with this we must also write off Poe's rather annoying mania of accusing his contemporaries of plagiarism—a harsh name he is in the habit of brandishing to indicate borrowings and echoes of a kind which, whether more or less abject, is usually perfectly harmless. Poe himself was certainly guilty—in his imitation of Chivers, for example—of borrowings equally harmless. But these, too, touched off the pretender.

As for the charge of Poe's acquiescence in the mawkish bad taste of his period, it is deserved to only a slight degree. He more often ran counter to this taste, as when he came down on Fitz-Greene Halleck; and, for the rest, his excessive enthusiasm for poets like Mrs. Osgood is attributable to the same sort of causes as, say, the praises of Bernard Shaw for the plays of Henry Arthur Jones: the writer who is potentially a master sees in the inferior writer a reflection of the kind of thing that he wants to do himself, but the possibilities of which will hardly be plain to anyone else till the master himself has made them actual.

We must recognize these warpings of Poe's line; but we must not allow them as serious impugnments of the validity of his critical work. His reading *was* wide and great, and his culture was derived from a plane of the world of thought and art which had hardly been visited by Longfellow with his patient persistent transposition of the poetry of many lands and ages into terms of his own insipidity or by Lowell with his awful cosy titles for his collections of literary essays: "My Study Windows" and "Among My Books." The truth is that literary America has always resented in Poe the very superiority which made him so quickly an international figure.

He may have been a difficult person, though certain people seem to have got on very well with him; but it seems hard to explain the virulence with which Griswold pursued him after his death and the general hostility toward him which has haunted us ever since, except on the ground that he puts us out by making so much of our culture seem second-rate. In our childhood we read "The Gold Bug" and "The Murders in the Rue Morgue," and everybody knows "Annabel Lee" and "Ulalume" and "The Bells" and "The Raven"; but Poe is not, as he is with the French and as he ought to be with us, a vital part of our intellectual equipment. It is rare that an American writer points out, as Waldo Frank once did, that Poe belongs not with the clever contrivers of fiction like O. Henry and S. S. Van Dine but, in terms of his constricted personality, with the great inquiring and versatile minds like Goethe. So that it is still worth while to insist on his value.

In the darkness of his solitary confinement Poe is still a prince.

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Power and Freedom

THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL MAN. By Peter F. Drucker. The John Day Company. $2.50.

DRUCKER'S "End of Economic Man" was by far the most profound study of the dynamics of Nazism we have had and a very convincing refutation of purely economic theories of social motivation. It revealed its author's original mind in the field of social analysis and philosophy. There are many evidences of the same originality in Drucker's new volume on "The Future of Industrial Man." But the conclusions at which he arrives are not always convincing, and some of his most striking insights are not substantiated with sufficient historical evidence.

He is concerned in this new volume with the problem of achieving both a functioning and a free society within the conditions set by modern industrialism. The difficulties of our industrial society are attributed primarily to the rise of an irresponsible oligarchy of managers whose "illegitimate" power is the consequence of the abdication of their responsibilities by the stockholders of corporations. The power of managers, he declares, is "in no way based upon a fundamental principle, accepted by society as a legitimate basis of power." He does not assume Burnham's fatalistic attitude toward this development, and he certainly does not regard managerial authority as adequate for the problems of an industrial age. But he does not show just why and how this "illegitimate" power, this managerial irresponsibility, has produced the evils of our age.

It is important to challenge the uncritical identification of economic power and ownership which liberal and Marxist theory has made. In actual fact the real power may be held by those who control, rather than own, the economic process. The failure to recognize this leads to the illusion that the socialization of all property will eliminate all inordinate disproportions of power and privilege in society, whereas it may actually produce a new oligarchy which combines the effective control of both economic and political power.

The recognition that ownership is not identical with power in the economic process may prevent some of the aberrations of the left. But it does not cure any of the maladjustments of society which must be attributed to the inordinate disproportions of power in the economic process, whether derived from ownership or managerial function. Nor is it safe to assume that the power of ownership is completely insignificant.

Drucker rightly regards large-scale unemployment as the most obvious manifestation of the failure of our society. "The most frightening thing about industrial unemployment in the past twenty years," he declares, "was that it persisted in periods of recovery and indeed of high prosperity." He thinks that it represents "not only economic catastrophe . . . but social disfranchisement." He stresses that economic security is no solution for this double evil, for unemployment benefits may give minimal security without insuring the unemployed worker of "social status and function." The Nazis, he observes, turned the unemployed into storm troopers and gave them social status and function. But their society is organized only for "war and conquest."

The distinction between economic function and social function is provisionally important, but if we ask how to give workers "social status and function" in a society not organized primarily for war, it will become apparent that social function must be related to economic function. The distinction is therefore not ultimately important. It is at any rate no valuable directive for the creation of a functioning society. Drucker's two fundamental insights in analyzing the problems of a functioning society are useful, but they are not so significant as he seems to believe.

The second portion of the volume is devoted to the problem of maintaining freedom in modern society. Here again he makes a valuable contribution, but he slightly overstates his case. His discussion of freedom centers in a very vigorous attack upon "rationalist liberals," who are "ultra-bold in theory and timid in action," who know what is right and just with greater certainty than any human knowledge deserves, but who cannot act because "they can neither compromise with power or fight for it." Their indecision, and the chaos created by their conflicting absolutes, invites totalitarianism. A Rousseau or a Marx emerges and transmutes a liberal ideal, such as equality, into an absolute for the sake of which he is ready to suppress all dissidence.

This analysis prompts Drucker to the equally convincing conclusion that a free society depends upon some humble recognition of the imperfection of all human viewpoints and of the corruption of interest in all political and party positions. From this recognition society must derive the desire and ambition to guarantee the free expression of all views, in the hope that commerce and competition among them will lead to more truth and justice than the monopoly of any supposedly absolutely true political creed.

The thesis, however, is slightly overstated and fails to do justice to the contribution of optimists to democratic theory. If the idea of human imperfection is stressed too consistently, it results in absolutist political theories, like those of Thomas Hobbes. For if all human points of view are merely the rationalization of interest, then society would be engulfed in the anarchy of conflicting interests and require the imposition of tyrannical authority, as Hobbes maintains.

Democracy rests partly upon the assumption that no political position can be absolutely right, but it also rests partly upon the assumption that there is sufficient coincidence between conflicting points of view to make an uncoerced commerce and competition between them possible and fruitful. Drucker hardly does justice to this second root of democratic theory and practice.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Season of Confusion

LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS. By David M. Potter. Yale University Press. $3.75.

LIKE all the seasons of doubt and confusion which precede great wars, the months between Lincoln's election and the bombardment of Fort Sumter contain much that is perplexing to students of a later day. The Republican leaders were entirely unprepared to meet the crisis of secession. With ambiguous and frequently inconsistent policies, they drifted blindly toward national disaster. Dr. Potter's study

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of the "secession winter" is a penetrating analysis of one of the most baffling periods in American history. A coherent and matured policy could not have been expected of the party which attained its first national success with Lincoln's election. Composed of dissentient factions, it was a minority party, trained in opposition but not in leadership. "The crisis . . . demanded that they produce a formula to save the Union . . . at a time when they had never borne the responsibility of appointing a postmaster."

A still greater obstacle to weathering the crisis was the Northern incredulity of the threat of secession. Because of a firm reliance on Southern feeling for the maintenance of the Union, the Republicans derided and ignored the growing movement for separation. Their complacent belief that secession was merely a temporary move in a political game persisted even after the Gulf States had withdrawn from the Union. Hence their refusal to compromise held no taint of conscienceless war-mongering—they were blandly unaware that war was the alternative.

Dr. Potter has high praise for William H. Seward's effectiveness in keeping the national authority unimpaired until the new Administration was installed. But he points out that, though Seward was active and Lincoln was silent, it was the enigmatic man in Springfield who assumed, from the very first, the control of his party. This was, in the opinion of the author, a questionable advantage, for he stigmatizes Lincoln's opposition to territorial compromise on slavery as the policy of a partisan leader. Lincoln had not yet attained the stature of great statesmanship; yet it seems severely critical to speak of his "consummate folly."

Whether or not the Civil War might have been avoided is a question which Dr. Potter refrains from answering. It is a question constantly posed by his material, and the author's declaration of opinion might have strengthened his book and resolved some of his estimates. But the material is excellently presented, and Dr. Potter's position as the sworn enemy of hindsight lends a freshness and illumination to the treatment.

MARGARET LEECH

Sea Warfare

A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO NAVAL STRATEGY. By Bernard Brodie. Princeton University Press. $2.50.

IT IS no exaggeration to say that Dr. Brodie, a professor of political science at Dartmouth, has produced here one of the very best recent books in the military field. In his "Sea Power in the Machine Age," published a year ago, he showed fine and careful scholarship and distinct writing ability as well as a faculty for interpreting data. His more recent volume indicates complete knowledge of his field, high scholarship, and refreshing absence of bias. Both books are well worth reading.

An idea of the scope of this later work is given by the chapter headings—Sea Power in Modern War, The Tools of Sea Power, Command of the Sea, Defense of Shipping, Land-Sea Operations, Bases, Tactics of Fleet Action, The Men Behind the Guns, and, for a long chapter devoted to the airplane-warship controversy, Must All Our Ships Have Wings? All these subsidiary topics are well treated, but the two chapters dealing with the tools of sea power form the most accurate and complete discussion of the subject which this reviewer has seen. Although written in July when shipping losses were at their highest point, the chapter on Defense of Shipping predicted that these would shortly be brought down—a prediction which has since been fulfilled. That on tactics is somewhat theoretical, and some naval men might be inclined to question its conclusions.

In his discussion of the place of the airplane in sea war Dr. Brodie pays full respect to the accomplishments of the plane but holds that its place in naval war has been greatly exalted by its proponents. Bombing planes in particular, with abundant opportunities during more than three years of war, have not lived up to expectations. The author admits that the torpedo plane is the greatest menace the warship faces today, but he believes that the problem of protection will be solved as it was for countless inventions in the past which appeared to revolutionize sea power. This chapter should be read with Major de Seversky's recent book in mind. Reviewing much the same historical data as those considered by De Seversky, Professor Brodie reaches diametrically opposed conclusions. Because of American negligence and Japanese treachery he feels that Pearl Harbor does not invalidate sea power. And the fact that under the very nose of the Luftwaffe the British, operating without air support, were able to withdraw 47,000 out of 60,000 troops from Crete does not indicate its obsolescence. Losses of both merchant ships and warships due to planes have so far been only a small fraction of those for all causes. In short, while the airplane has greatly affected sea war, it has not destroyed the value of any kind of sea power, especially that of the battleship. Whether or not these conclusions are correct, they are worthy of consideration and offer a good antidote to those critics who see victory only in terms of air power.

"A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy" has many virtues. It is erudite in its background, balanced in interpretation, and cogent in reasoning. Unlike many recent books it is not written to convert anyone. Its only major weakness lies in the amount of detail and the lack of colorful illustration. It is, frankly, a trifle over the head of the average layman and is more apt to be read by students of war than by the general public.

DONALD W. MITCHELL

Klee as Archaic

PAUL KLEE: PAINTINGS, WATERCOLORS, 1913 TO 1939. Edited by Karl Nierendorf. Introduction by James Johnson Sweeney. Oxford University Press. $6.

A DISTINCTION of Berenson's may be recalled as one examines the art of Klee:

> No art can hope to become classic that has not been archaic first. The distinction between archaistic imitation and archaic reconstruction, simple as it is, must be clearly borne in mind. An art that is merely adopting the ready-made models handed down from an earlier time is archaistic, while an art that is going through the process of learning to construct the figures and discover the attitudes required for the presentation of tactile values and movement is archaic. On the other hand, an art which has completed the process is classic.

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Klee's art is authentic reconstruction, not so much of "tactile values" as of movement (now that the faddishness of Berenson's formula has passed, we may admit that it has become an element of every intelligent appreciation); but above movement, of imagery, and beyond imagery, of a visionary and intuitional immediacy that sustains the unprejudiced innocence of perception without sacrificing the crystallizing intensity and coherence of genuine analysis or the severely objectifying sensibility that enforces the analysis. This sensibility he integrated with both wit and intellect, and he brought the preconscious to utterance, not with the loose and exhibitionistic self-indulgence of most current surrealism or with the denatured rigor of the more absolute abstractionists, but with an acute delicacy of nervous definition that rightly makes him envied and yet independent of both those rival and, in most cases, logically self-exhausting and inconclusive schools. Whether it was the music and poetry mentioned by Mr. Nierendorf in his biographical sketch as major passions of Klee that bred his disdain of a too theoretical sterility, or whether—as is more likely—it was his native and vigorous wholeness of sensibility, there is no mistaking here the presence of an authority that touched the quick nerve of a purpose and intention, and so brought into modern art one of its severest and yet most humane inventors.

Mr. Sweeney's foreword is apologetic to the point of misinformation ("Klee's art is engagingly simple of approach") and of irrelevance ("Klee does not pretend to reproduce the visible world"), and it makes sales talk of the symbolic principle; but it is engagingly persuasive, and with these well-chosen plates should aid the two Museum of Modern Art exhibitions (1930 and 1941) in furthering in America the knowledge of one of the most remarkable of modern creative personalities, a rival in his field with Chirico, Picasso, Miro, and the better Ernst, an immediate corrective to the excesses of Dali and his followers, and a master of one of the most living lines, subtle surfaces, intense sensibilities, and exploring intelligences the art of our time has known.

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

The Nazis in Poland

THE BLACK BOOK OF POLAND. Issued by the Polish Ministry of Information. G. P. Putnam's Sons. $3.

THE Polish Ministry of Information here assembles the detailed records of what surely is the most appalling attempt to obliterate a nation since the days of Genghis Khan. As these pages pile thousands of verified details one upon another, we lose all human sense of magnitude. Newspaper readers shudder when they read that a hundred persons have perished in a flood or an earthquake. They cannot shudder much more if the number is a thousand. When the record shows death, torture, exile, enslavement for hundreds of thousands, the imagination goes numb.

Here are accounts of tens of thousands shot as hostages or merely for the crime of being respected leaders of the people, of hundreds of thousands sent into virtual slavery as common laborers in foreign countries, of millions deported from their homes, often on a few hours' notice, and dumped into strange lands without prospect of livelihood. Here we read of systematic stealing of property ranging from household effects to business corporations and landed estates. We read of priests and professors selected for the concentration camp or the firing squad merely because of their patriotic opinions, of squads of young girls requisitioned for "required service" in German army brothels. We read details of cruelties practiced by German soldiers on the streets, in prisons, in private homes. And we read how, as the Poles are driven from the farms they own, Germans are systematically moved in, to take possession.

The catalogue of horror is endless. Make every conceivable allowance for the difficulty of obtaining attested statements for such a compilation as this, allow for the unreliability of rumor, for the patriotic impulse to represent stern military measures as atrocities, for the tendency of propagandists to estimate in large figures; still this book reveals the persecution of a great people carried out on a scale and with a systematic sadism previously unknown in modern times.

It is hopeless to attempt to summarize in limited space the multitude of forms which this persecution has taken. But let us try to obtain from these pages some outline of the crude logic and purpose behind it.

For there is a logic in it—a Nazi logic. It would seem that Hitler has two immediate objects: (1) to "Germanize" western Poland, with its predominantly Polish and Jewish population of ten million, the part incorporated into the Reich, by depriving all non-Germans of their property and then dumping them en masse into the "Government General" lying just east; and (2) to reduce the Polish and Jewish multitudes of this latter province to a permanent condition of hewers of wood and drawers of water for the German *Herrenvolk*—a subject race without culture or social leaders, without any save the most elementary education, without any civil rights save the obligation to serve their masters.

Is it possible to maintain such a slave economy under modern conditions? Undoubtedly it is physically possible for a long time, provided the armies of the *Herrenvolk* are always victorious. But there are indications, even in this necessarily vague account of German economy in conquered Poland, that the Polish soil does not now yield what it used to, that such factories as are permitted to remain do not produce up to normal—in short, that slave economy is distinctly not a going concern in Poland.

This "Black Book of Poland" does not attempt any record of the lot of the inhabitants of those parts of Poland which were for nearly two years, in 1939-41, under Soviet rule. From all we know, hard as their life may have been under crisis conditions, the Soviet government has never discriminated between Poles and Jews and others of its citizens. If the Polish Government-in-Exile possesses factual information as to the condition of the Polish population that was "conquered" by its present ally, Russia, it seems regrettable that it did not incorporate such information in this book.

And why on earth does the Polish Information Bureau forbid the reproduction of any parts of its record "in any form without permission"?

HIRAM MOTHERWELL

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IN BRIEF

EAST OF FAREWELL. By Howard Hunt. Alfred A. Knopf. $2.50.

An absorbing novel by a twenty-four-year-old ensign about life on a United States destroyer—a book about this war written by someone who has actually fought in it, and the kind of book that in the last war was not written until the war was over. Mr. Hunt has no doubts that the fight must be fought and won, but like the officers who are the chief actors in his drama, he isn't trying to convince either himself or anyone else that to convoy a group of freighters through submarine-infested waters is a romantic pastime. The men are bored, dispirited, short-tempered, and at odds with each other; they don't have the right kind of food or enough sleep, they suffer from extremes of heat and cold; even the boat itself isn't all it should be. There is a literalness, almost a simple-mindedness, in the narrative that seems to vouch for its authenticity as reporting—the automatic way in which, even as a novelist, Mr. Hunt separates his officer world from his world of enlisted seamen; or the uneditorialized report of the officers' attitude toward their colored servants. Yet when the destroyer finally does engage the enemy, every man does his job beautifully and bravely: victory is the only glamour. That a realistic novel of this kind can be written and published at the beginning of a war is surely a high compliment to our peculiar much-to-be-cherished brand of American morale.

THE BEST AMERICAN SHORT STORIES, 1942. Edited by Martha Foley. Houghton Mifflin Company. $2.75.

Mixture as before, put together this time by Martha Foley instead of the late Edward J. O'Brien, representing everything from the *Saturday Evening Post* to the small quarterlies. Most of the selections are unimpressive, but there is a beautifully talented story by Nelson Algren, Biceps, from the *Southern Review* and a nice piece, Those Are as Brothers, by Nancy Hale, from *Mademoiselle*. The *New Yorker* representation, despite Miss Foley's prefatory salute, is well beneath the best of that magazine: the Bemelmans selection, The Valet of the Splendide, is surely that fine writer at his least happy, and the Sally Benson story, one of her Kensington reminiscences, is the *New Yorker* at its limpest. Thurber is represented by an over-the-shoulder baseball yarn from the *Saturday Evening Post* and Steinbeck by a mild but pleasant sketch, from *Harper's*, about how a little girl named Edith McGillcuddy met R. L. Stevenson.

THE LITTLE PEOPLE. By Albert Halper. Harper and Brothers. $2.50.

In the thirties Mr. Halper's novel about a group of retail-store employees—clerks, salesmen, delivery boys, elevator operators, hatters, and the like—would have been announced as proletarian literature; in the forties it is fashionable to think of such persons as "little people." The change in political approach, between the two decades, is clearly reflected in Mr. Halper's approach to his story. There are no trade unions, strikes, or demonstrations in this novel; love is a valid, end-in-itself problem; even an employer is allowed his human miseries. For the rest, so far as insight into character goes, "The Little People" comes out of the same old competent—very competent—realism machine.

THE PRODIGAL WOMEN. By Nancy Hale. Charles Scribner's Sons. $3.

In adolescence Miss Hale's prodigal women—two sisters and a friend who grow up together near Boston—are full of vitality and high hope, but love and marriage put an end to the promise of their youth. This is the bald outline of Miss Hale's story: it scarcely suggests the psychological extravagance with which it is developed. Concentrating on the relations between men and women, Miss Hale provides her three heroines with two men who belong nowhere but in a psychiatric case book. Instead of going crazy themselves, however, the men drive their wives crazy—in one case, literally—and confusion is twice confounded by the fact that the wives clearly ask for just this kind of treatment; Miss Hale even stacks the cards on the side of pathology by demonstrating that the life of the only woman who resists subjugation to a man issues in emptiness. In all this welter of sexual paradox one wonders where the author herself stands. In a scene near the close of the book, when a conversation turns to politics, one of the characters points out the analogy between dominating men and conquering countries, between masochistic nations and masochistic women. Clutching at straws and recalling the stern bias against fascism which Miss Hale has expressed in her stories, one cherishes the faint hope that she intended her novel as political parable, though if it *is* parable, it is entirely unsuccessful. To anyone acquainted with Nancy Hale's intelligent well-knit short fiction, her 700-page novel must be a great disappointment.

THEN WE SHALL HEAR SINGING. By Storm Jameson. The Macmillan Company. $2.50.

Miss Jameson has written a grim fantasy on the subject of what science can and cannot do in support of political evil. To a village in a German-conquered protectorate comes an eminent German surgeon with a plan to destroy people's will to freedom by destroying certain sections of the brain; in the course of his experiment he discovers that there are factors which his "medicine" has failed to take into account. Despite a perhaps inevitable touch of mysticism, Miss Jameson's novel is distinguished by its refusal to make political hope too easy, and by Miss Jameson's creative handling of her simple villagers.

THIS SIDE OF LAND. By Elizabeth Hollister Frost. Coward-McCann. $2.75.

Mrs. Frost's novel about the early settlers of Nantucket is subtitled "An Island Epic," and epic it is, if to write an epic is to lard your prose with eccentricities that pass for poetry and make a heavy-handed to-do about the primal forces. There is no question that Mrs. Frost has mastered her historical material: when what she *knows* about life in Nantucket, as opposed to what she feels, manages to come through her overladen narrative it is fascinating stuff—which is, of course, all the more reason to regret that she didn't pass it on less self-consciously. Added sour note: at least one reader could dispense with twins named Me-Me and You-You and an infant named Bay-be.

FRONTIER PASSAGE. By Ann Bridge. Little, Brown and Company. An Atlantic Monthly Press Book. $2.50.

Neither the flesh of a spy story, fish of polite fiction, nor fowl of political commentary, Miss Bridge's new novel still manages to do a pleasant and decent job. It is about an English family by the name of Oldhead—father, mother, and seventeen-year-old daughter Rosemary—who come to the town of St. Jean-de-Luz on the French-Spanish border in the last year of the Spanish civil war; Rosemary makes the acquaintance of an assortment of newspapermen and refugees, both red and white, and be-

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comes precociously involved in a series of border intrigues. By no means a "serious" book but an interesing example of the effect of our turbulent times on a conscientious writer in a modest tradition, and notable for one fine descriptive chapter on the French reception of the first refugees from Franco's terror.

THE DOLLAR GOLD PIECE. By Virginia Swain. Farrar and Rinehart. $2.75.

Kansas City in the 1880's, what it looked like, how its people dressed and ate, the color of daily life in a boom city in the Middle West—a whole wealth of patient detail to embroider a shabby story about an heiress and a pair of fortune hunters, one an anonymous young man from the East, the other a scheming young woman befriended by the heroine's father. The chief distinction of Miss Swain's novel is its curious morbidity. The major suspense of the story, for instance, hangs on the revelation of the heroine's mysterious malady; the heroine's father and the scheming lady secretly read up on it in medical books; there is a villain who is horrified by disease but has the misfortune constantly to stumble on dogs with broken legs and beggars with no legs at all; a neighbor's child has a penchant for murdering her dolls—and so on.

Drama Note

"BIRD IN HAND" (Morosco Theater) is announced as the first of "a series of established Broadway plays" to be offered at $2.20 and down per admission ticket. Such ambitious announcements are not always to be taken as binding promises, but the present enterprise at least deserves good wishes. Some critics complained that the opening performance left something to be desired in the way of smoothness, but when I saw the piece several days later the presentation of Drinkwater's pleasant if not exactly searching comedy about the younger generation struck me as competent all the way through and quite admirable so far as the contributions of Romney Brent and Harry Sothern were concerned. It should also be reported that the appreciative audience did not seem to find the play any more old-fashioned than it was intended to be.

As for George Abbott's "Beat the Band" (Forty-sixth Street Theater), I must admit that I have no great fondness for such polite and plot-ridden musical comedies and much prefer the more orgiastic review. Even so, I think I am safe in saying that "Beat the Band" is pretty mild even for its genre and should be recommended only to those whose prejudice in favor of the so-called sophisticated operetta is as strong as I admit my prejudice against it to be. J. W. K.

MUSIC

MUCH of Berlioz's "Romeo and Juliet" is not only exquisitely contrived as sound and as music but marvelously contrived for the realization of the poetic qualities of the episodes it deals with. I say this about the work as it reached my ears at the recent performances by Toscanini with the New York Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra; and my statement therefore characterizes the performances as well as the music. Toscanini's approach to the music was at all times by way of the poetic situation: it was as the pronouncement of an angered prince that the passage for the brass in the Introduction was worked over for quality of sound, inflection, legato, portamento; at the point where Romeo's entrance into the vault of the Capulets *Allegro agitato e disperato* broke off, Toscanini prefaced the soft antiphonal chords of the brass, the woodwinds, the strings with hushing outspread arms and the words "grand silence!" and the tearing phrases later in this section caused him to remind the orchestra: "DI-SPER-A-TO! You are all DI-SPER-A-TI!"

His poetic insight operated through the unique musicality that produced its usual marvels of inflected, contoured phrases and plastically moulded forms; poetic insight and musicality made use of the ear for beauty of sound and texture, the technical mastery that produced what the ear desired; technical mastery was made effective by the will, the concentration, the intensity which—on this occasion as on so many others—had to overcome the inertia, the indifference of some for whom this was merely work for pay. It was not until the second performance that the beauty of sound and texture was fully achieved by the orchestra; not until the third that the horns played their difficult passage in Queen Mab without the blemishes that had disfigured it previously. On the other hand the singing of the Westminster Choir and of Jennie Tourel was superb at all three performances.

With music like Berlioz's it is poetic insight; with other music it may be called emotional insight; and in Toscanini's performances of Beethoven or Mozart, no less than in his performance of "Romeo and Juliet" there is not a tempo, not a nuance that does not proceed from his feeling for what the music is about. The feeling is his own; it is very often different from Koussevitzky's, Beecham's, Walter's; it may be different from yours or mine; and though one must respect it one does not have to agree with it. My idea of what Schubert's Unfinished Symphony is about is different from the one that Toscanini expressed in his broadcast performance last year (notwithstanding which I would want to hear the performance every time he gave it); but the man who produced that mercurial finale of Haydn's "Clock" Symphony, with its subtle, sharp inflections, understands Haydn for me. And this understanding was evident in the performance of the great Symphony No. 99 at the second week's concerts of the New York Philharmonic-Symphony Society—a performance marvelous as a construction in sound embodying content, blemished this time by the occasional dryness and stridency of the strings in fortissimos.

At these concerts there was also a performance of Shostakovitch's Seventh Symphony, which I would have been able to listen to after Brahms's First, but not after Haydn's No. 99.

The "Gramophone Shop Encyclopedia of Recorded Music," originally compiled by R. D. Darrell and published in 1936, has been revised by George Clark Leslie (Simon & Schuster, $3.95). Though it does not mention his name the new volume retains the larger part of Mr. Darrell's 1936 listings and his elucidations of the complications of some of the listings; the revision subtracts and adds what was withdrawn and issued between 1936 and December 1941 for foreign records, June 1942 for domestic, and offers new introductions to some of the composers. The book assembles and arranges in convenient form the information that is to be got only from a number of catalogues; on the other hand a statement on the front of the jacket—that the book "lists the best performances of the best works"—which gives the impression that it is also a selective guide, is misleading. The best are listed, but together with the less good, and with nothing to distinguish one from the other in music, performance, or recording. B. H. HAGGIN

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Letters to the Editors

Changes in the C. I. C.

Dear Sirs: I feel that when *The Nation* has more information on the problem which the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives have faced, it will not regard the recent administrative changes as inimical to democracy in China.

The cooperatives were organized near the start of the Sino-Japanese war because a few farsighted individuals saw that China's final victory would depend as much on economic as on military resistance. They have enjoyed a close relationship with the Chinese government from the beginning, since their initial capital—$5,000,000 (Chinese)—was loaned by the government, and they receive a subsidy of $20,000 (Chinese) monthly, without which they could not continue. Today 35 per cent of the total capital is supplied by the government, about 10 per cent comes from paid-up shares owned by the workers, and the rest is mainly supplied by the Chinese banks. Their own financial machinery is being developed in the Kung Ho treasuries, already organized in many localities, with the hope of a Central Cooperative Bank.

The organization has had the interest and generous support of friends abroad, especially the overseas Chinese. With support from the Philippines, Malaya, and Java cut off, the contributions from British and American friends are correspondingly important.

The American committee, known as Indusco, Inc., has remitted funds to an International Committee in China. In doing so, it has by-passed the Central Headquarters of the C. I. C. This has made an unfortunate triangle, creating within the movement in China dual control and dual loyalties and an uneven disbursement of funds. Central Headquarters must be able to account for all revenue, whether from the government or from contributions.

If I know Rewi Alley and I *think* I have known him for fifteen years, he is one of the last men to desire to be put on a pedestal as the sole founder and indispensable head of a great Chinese organization. But I fear he thought the only way to retain American aid was to insist on letting the International Committee—British and American with one Chinese as secretary—receive *and disburse* American gifts, ignoring Central Headquarters and the Central Executive Committee, which is Chinese.

Admittedly the Central Executive Committee was not elected by the individual cooperatives. But neither was the International Committee. The new secretary-general, a man of high integrity and fine administrative record, Z. Y. Chow, was not so chosen. But neither was Rewi Alley, nor George Hogg, nor Ralph Lapwood, nor any of the other regional directors and inspectors. The units are not that articulate yet. They are already organizing themselves into federations to handle supply and marketing. Local federations will organize into regional ones. And a national federation will finally emerge, bringing to fruition the highest hope of the C. I. C. leaders—that the cooperatives will finally be completely self-governing.

In the meantime, C. I. C. administration is no less decentralized than before. The Chinese government has no more control than formerly. There is no reason to lose faith in either the cooperatives or China. To seek to run the movement by the remote control of our contributions from America would be a form of philanthropic imperialism as outmoded in China today as extra-territorial rights. Its true meaning would be none the less apparent if cloaked as "liberalism seeking to circumvent an undemocratic government." The C. I. C. need encouragement and support from abroad, but they will remain a Chinese organization under Chinese leadership. And they will be one of the most significant movements the world has ever seen.

GERALDINE T. FITCH

New York, October 22

[*The Nation* is glad to pass on to its readers the information contained in this letter. Unfortunately, many persons who have been closely associated with Chinese cooperatives from their formation are profoundly disturbed by the recent reorganization, believing that its purpose is to crush any development of democracy in the movement.]

Grand Fellows

Dear Sirs: The following is taken from a letter just received by my family from a young British naval officer whom we entertained last summer while his ship was in port here for repairs:

> The most popular, well-mannered, well-behaved, respectful, and soldierly warriors ever to land on English soil are your American Negro troops. This is the nation-wide opinion and a very strong one too; they quite outshine the white Americans in popularity, even the nicest type of female enjoys their company and their courteousness. Isn't it strange? or is it? Unfortunately, the American authorities over here have requested that Negro soldiers be barred from certain clubs, pubs, and the like. Our own authorities have agreed to post notices but absolutely refuse to give the police the authority to interfere in any way. I do not think our attitude will alter; I am sure it won't. After all, which is preferable, a crowd of quiet interesting Negroes or a crowd of noisy English or American soldiers? Anyway, the Negro soldier is considered a real grand fellow, and if his present exemplary behavior continues, he will continue to be thought so.

October 19 L. B. S.

For Martin Dies— a "Way to Heaven"

[*The following letter was sent to Representative Dies in Washington; a copy of it to us. It is published here as a ringing answer to the charges of disloyalty Martin Dies has leveled against large groups of American citizens.*]

Dear Sir: In your defense to Congress against the Attorney General's report that your charges of Communist sympathy against more than one thousand government officials are unsupported, you repeat the charge against nineteen officials, including myself, and also include several organizations.

If you made an investigation, you found, what you already knew, that I am a Democrat, but distinguished from yourself in at least one particular—that I am an Administration Democrat. From the beginning I have been devoted to the Administration's defense and war measures, as I am to its domestic policies. You will of course recall conferences you and I have had in the past respecting pending legislation recommended by the President. I urged you to support it. You criticized and opposed it. You had a perfect right to oppose such measures, but you have no right to misinterpret my views and my attitude.

Far more serious than your attacks upon myself or any individual are the indiscriminate and inaccurate charges of disloyalty leveled from time to time

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against large groups of loyal citizens, such as the Farmers' Union and many labor organizations. The Farmers' Union, for example, as you and everyone else knows, is an organization of patriotic farm men and women. At this moment they are helping to feed the nation, pay its bills, and fight its battles. Thousands of its members and their sons are serving in the armed forces. This organization is vigorously cooperating with the President to bring about a higher degree of national unity in order more effectively to prosecute the war, to curb inflation, and to plan postwar security.

An honest report would not conceal but would reveal these facts.

Labor unions are another example. More than two thousand of the Maritime Workers, as you must know, have perished on torpedoed ships, yet these seamen continue to volunteer for this hazardous service to insure delivery of food and war supplies to our allies. Must they continue to sail submarine-infested seas with charges of disloyalty ringing in their ears?

An honest report would reveal these facts.

Allowing for some exceptions, management, labor, and farmers have joined hands with the Administration to give to the nation a maximum of striking power against the enemy. An honest report would record these facts, plus the fact that tens of thousands of members of these organizations are in the nation's armed forces on every battle front.

You know very well that this government and its people, by cooperating with our Russian ally to crush Hitlerism, is not embracing communism any more than our alliance with the people of China commits us to chopsticks or Taoism, although I might commend to you the Taoist precept that "to withdraw into obscurity is the way to heaven." At this moment the American people and our armed forces are watching with intense hope the heroic defense of Stalingrad. The suggestion that this sympathy with the steadfast Red Army is un-American is plain political claptrap. The battle raging in that Hitler-created hell is as much ours as the battles of the Atlantic and Pacific in which our own resolute sons are fighting to destroy Hitler's power.

I am a relatively unimportant government official. Nevertheless, as a citizen and supporter of the government and its war measures I must challenge any Hitlerized methods and procedures designed to lynch the reputations of citizens and their organizations without hearing or trial, while they are giving to the nation the best service of which they are capable. Those who are unfit for service either in the armed forces or on the civilian front can at least abstain from poisoning the atmosphere in which their fellow-citizens must fight and work. If you want something un-American to investigate you can find a wide variety of home-grown Nazis and Fascists. The FBI and the press are turning them up almost every day.

MERLE D. VINCENT

New York, October 20

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